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This paper interrogates the breadth, necessity, and collateral effects of 
Canada’s child pornography law, as contained in the Criminal Code. The author 
argues that the inclusion of “fantasy” images in the definition of child 
pornography is over-inclusive, and considers that this may make the law 
illegitimate and discriminatory. She proposes that this over-inclusive definition 
arises from the conflation of a particular type of sexual desire with harm to 
children. The author draws loosely on deliberative democratic theory to 
structure her analysis of the law’s legitimacy, and uses Charter analysis to both 
critique the current law and suggest means of addressing the law’s potentially 
discriminatory character. The author does not support or promote sexual 
abuse or exploitation of children, nor does she suggest that child pornography 
should be wholly de-regulated or de-criminalized. 
Note: This paper was completed in April 2015.  Due to current employment 
restrictions on updating the research, the case law and legislation cited herein 
are current to that date only. 
Citation: (2016) 25 Dal J Leg Stud 25. 
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The inclusion of “fantasy” images and writing in Canada’s Criminal Code 
definition of child pornography at s. 163.1 is based upon and gives the force of 
law to a socially-constructed villain: the paedophile.1 I propose that this definition 
may be over-inclusive and requires reconsideration because the law may be 
illegitimate and discriminatory. In particular, this inclusion draws a largely 
unsubstantiated connection between a pathologized form of sexual desire on the 
one hand and harm to children on the other.  
Section 163.1 looks broad but acceptable if we accept at face value the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s (“SCC”) standard of assessment and justifications for 
the law as articulated in R v Sharpe.2 The laudable objective of protecting children 
buttresses such an interpretation. I propose we look deeper by questioning why 
the law is drawn so broadly and who is affected by this expansive approach. 
Paedophiles – by which I mean those with a sexual attraction to minors – are 
subject to criminal sanction for gratifying their sexual desire through the use of 
pornography.3 For child pornography involving actual children, the fact of sexual 
assault and exploitation in producing the materials unquestionably justifies this 
restriction.4 But that is not necessarily the case for “fantasy” materials.  
I propose that this question – whether fantasy materials are properly 
included in s. 163.1 or whether their inclusion makes the law illegitimate – has 
not been asked because paedophiles are not publicly, legislatively, or judicially 
seen as rights-holders in respect of that aspect of their personhood. To explore 
this perspective I draw on both deliberative democracy and constitutional 
arguments. Equality and reason are the twin deliberative democratic 
requirements. Equality refers to the idea that each citizen must occupy a position 
                                                                                                                                         
1 Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985 c C-46, s. 163.1 [Criminal Code]. 
2 R v Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2 [Sharpe]. The standard is a “reasoned apprehension of harm” and the justifications are 
incitement, grooming, and cognitive distortions. 
3 I use the term “paedophile” throughout this paper to refer to people who are sexually attracted to minors. I 
recognize this is broader than the psychiatric definition and have chosen the term for convenience. I do 
not, however, unquestioningly support the pathologization of this form of sexual desire. For a fuller 
discussion of the medical definition, its relationship to the legal definition of child pornography, and the 
problems with categorizing certain sexual desires as mental illness, below. 
4 But see Harris Mirkin, “The Social, Political, and Legal Construction fo the Concept of Child Pornography” 
(2009) 56:2 Journal of Homosexuality 233.  
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equal to that of every other citizen in respect of both their fundamental individual 
liberties and their public autonomy. Reasoned deliberation requires that parties 
base their arguments on rational arguments that can be understood by all other 
parties and respectfully listen to and try to understand others’ reasons. I propose 
that the drafting of s. 163.1 violated these requirements, making the law 
potentially illegitimate.  
I look at judicial constitutional analysis as a form of reason-giving and 
question whether the current formula for ensuring government adherence to the 
social contract is flawed. Social context makes it unlikely that the requirements of 
equality and reasons can be met without legal intervention. It also makes legal 
intervention through either legislation or a successful challenge under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms unlikely.5 As such, s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter 
might be the appropriate vehicles for understanding and rectifying the law’s 
excesses and for examining the legitimacy of a law based on a social construction 
that excludes those subject to it from the democratic community from which is 
arises. 
Whereas people with normative sexualities are entitled not only to assert 
their sexual desires, but to obtain sexual gratification through pornography, 
paedophiles are categorically precluded from accessing any such materials, 
regardless of the involvement of or harm to actual children. The idea of normative 
sexuality is a moving target, but it certainly includes heterosexuals and 
homosexuals, and increasingly also encompasses certain historically deviant 
desires such as BDSM.6 The fundamentally contingent nature of normative 
sexuality, and thus what is permissible sexual gratification versus criminal offence, 
points to the socially contingent nature of the criminalization of certain sexual 
practices.7 This social contingence in turn raises questions of democratic 
                                                                                                                                         
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
6 A category of erotic play encompassing bondage and discipline, dominance and submission, and sadism and 
masochism. 
7 Elaine Craig, Troubling Sex: Towards a Legal Theory of Sexual Integrity (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) at 5-6, 10-
44. 
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legitimacy when those who are affected by a law are excluded from the debate 
around its enactment and are unrepresented by those who were included.  
Few would seriously question the often visceral abhorrence that arises in 
conjunction with the idea of the paedophile. While opposition to child sexual 
abuse is appropriate, vilifying paedophilic desire is unnecessary. Once this visceral 
reaction is critically examined, it is arguable that Canada’s legal definition of child 
pornography may be out of step with empirical reality. As such, the law may be 
democratically illegitimate, discriminatory, and an unjustified infringement on 
paedophiles’ rights to liberty and security of the person. Where legislation, judicial 
interpretation, and medical and social discourse are interwoven, as in the case of 
child pornography and paedophilia, it is necessary to disaggregate and critically 
examine the law as it arises from and contributes to broader socio-political 
understandings. Elaine Craig has cautioned that “it is always important to 
recognize the relationship between a legal process, such as the criminal justice 
system, and its constitutive role in the social context in which it operates”.8 While 
legislation sets the initial parameters of a solution to a social problem, the courts 
are charged with ensuring legislation goes no further than is necessary to protect 
legitimate social interests. I propose that the problem of s. 163.1 lies in the 
legislative definition, but that the court is complicit in perpetuating and giving the 
stamp of legitimacy to socio-political prejudices.  
Building on other scholars’ analyses of child pornography legislation as a 
‘moral panic’, an unjustifiably broad restriction on freedom of expression, and a 
conflation of social, medical, and legal discourses, I propose that this view of 
paedophiles as disentitled to any right to sexual gratification is based on the 
presumption that all paedophiles either have, or inevitably will, assault children.9 
                                                                                                                                         
8 Elaine Craig, “Person(s) of Interest and Missing Women: Legal Abandonment in the Downtown Eastside” 
(2014) 60:1 McGill LJ 1 at 36 [“Person(s) of Interest”]. 
9 On child pornography legislation as a moral panic, see e.g. Suzanne Ost, “Children at Risk: Legal and 
Societal Perceptions of the Potential Threat that the Possession of Child Pornography Poses to Society” 
29:3 Journal of Law and Society 436; David Gurnham, Memory, Imagination, Justice: Intersections of Law and 
Literature (Surrey, Eng: Ashgate Publishing, 2009) at 113-32. On child pornography legislation as an 
unjustifiably broad restriction on freedom of expression, see e.g. Bruce Ryder, “The Harms of Child 
Pornography Law” (2003) 36 UBC L Rev 101; Sara M Smyth, “A ‘Reasoned Apprehension’ of 
overbreadth: an alternative approach to the problems presented by section 163.1 of the Criminal Code” 
(2009) 42 UBC L Rev 69; Gurnham, supra note 9 at 113-32; Suzanne Ost, supra note 9. On child 
pornography legislation as a conflation of social, medical, and legal discourses, see e.g. Elise Chenier, “The 
Natural Order of Disorder: Pedophilia, Stranger Danger and the Normalising Family” (2012) 16 Sexuality 
& Culture 172; Harris Mirkin, supra note 4. 
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If no children are involved in the production of the material, harm can only ensue 
if the use of this material will result in other offences, be they the use or 
production of child pornography involving real children or contact offences 
against children. It is this rationale that supports the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
justifications for the law’s inclusion of fantasy materials.  
If the criminalization of fantasy pornography is unnecessary to achieve the 
law’s objective of protecting children, the law goes further than is necessary. 
While this potential overbreadth has been the target of repeated scholarly inquiry, 
the concern has universally been freedom of expression: if the provision need not 
cover these materials, it is an unjustified infringement of expression. My concern 
lies with the sexual integrity and equality of paedophiles. Expanding the s. 163.1 
defences could help to rectify the law’s overbreadth. But recognizing the law’s 
effect on paedophiles’ Charter rights – namely, the s. 7 liberty or security of the 
person rights or the s. 15 equality right – would better rectify the socio-political 
exclusion of paedophiles and could be used as a means of protecting paedophiles’ 
ability to access pornographic content that does not cause harm to children. In 
particular, exempting fantasy pornography from the ambit of s. 163.1 is an avenue 
worth exploring as a means to balance children’s and paedophiles’ rights.  
Two matters of definition and scope require attention at the outset. First, I 
do not wholly subscribe to the medical model of paedophilia as an illness. The 
word “paedophile” both connotes mental illness and carries social stigma and 
assumptions, and I attempt to question both the social stigma that attaches to the 
term and the conceptualization of paedophilia as an illness rather than a sexual 
identity. Sexual desires are just that: desires, not acts. This paper suggests that 
rather than categorize particular sexual desires as bad, those who have them as 
sick, and any behaviour associated with them as criminal, sexual desire should be 
regulated only to the extent it harms others. I have nevertheless chosen to use the 
term “paedophile” to refer to those with sexual desire for minors because the 
alternatives are cumbersome. Second, throughout this paper, I suggest that the 
scope of the criminal prohibition against child pornography requires re-
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examination and should perhaps be narrowed. It is important to clarify the extent 
of my proposal. Again, I rely on the distinction between desire and act: I neither 
advocate that child pornography using real children should be permitted nor that 
sexual relationships between adults and children are acceptable. My proposal is 
much more limited; I suggest that “fantasy” pornography may be unnecessarily 
criminalized. 
After introducing Canada’s child pornography provision, my argument 
proceeds in six parts. First, I explain the relationship between child pornography 
and paedophilia, demonstrating how child pornography laws target paedophiles 
as a group and exploring the relationship between medical and legal definitions. 
Second, I discuss the stigmatization that attaches to paedophilia. Third, I briefly 
explore the theory of deliberative democracy as it relates to paedophilia and child 
pornography, arguing that the Parliamentary process for s. 163.1 did not satisfy 
the deliberative democratic model. Fourth, I analyze Sharpe, the leading case on 
s. 163.1. Fifth, I present recent social scientific research that undercuts the 
reasoning in Sharpe. Finally, I offer the broad outlines of a proposal for rectifying 
the illegitimate and discriminatory character of s. 163.1. 
Canada’s child pornography regime is an outgrowth of certain 1970s social 
developments: feminism, the anti-pornography movement, and the growing 
awareness of child sexual abuse.10  
Before 1993, child pornography was not explicitly defined in the Criminal 
Code and was addressed under the general obscenity provision in s. 163.11 At law, 
material is obscene when the undue exploitation of sex is its dominant 
                                                                                                                                         
10 Smyth, supra note 9 at 75. Obscenity law is the framework for regulating pornography, but feminist anti-
pornography campaigners shifted the obscenity debate from “vague notions of public decency and 
morality” to a harm-based critique that used a definition of harm including “social harm” arising from the 
influence of pornography on “public attitudes and beliefs”. Ibid 75-76. See especially R v Butler, [1992] 1 
SCR 452, [1992] 2 WWR 577, 1992 CarswellMan 100 [cited to Carswell] (WL CAN). 
11 Criminal Code, supra note 1 at s. 163. 
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characteristic.12 Whether the exploitation was “undue” was historically 
determined by a community standards test that focused on “what Canadians […] 
would not tolerate other Canadians being exposed to”.13 In Butler, Sopinka J 
upheld the constitutionality of the obscenity provision but discarded the 
community standards test in favour of a harm-based approach that evaluates 
whether the exploitation of sex is “undue”: 
Pornography can be usefully divided into three categories:  (1) explicit 
sex with violence, (2) explicit sex without violence but which subjects 
people to treatment that is degrading or dehumanizing, and (3) explicit 
sex without violence that is neither degrading nor dehumanizing.  […]  
The courts must determine as best they can what the community 
would tolerate others being exposed to on the basis of the degree of 
harm that may flow from such exposure.  Harm in this context means 
that it predisposes persons to act in an anti-social manner which 
society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper 
functioning.  […] 14 
Sopinka J also explicitly drew a line between adult pornography and child 
pornography: “explicit sex that is not violent and neither degrading nor 
dehumanizing is generally tolerated in our society and will not qualify as the undue 
exploitation of sex unless it employs children in its production.”15 In other words, 
material that used children in its production would always constitute an undue 
exploitation of sex.  
The growing hyper-visibility of child pornography in the 1970s and 1980s 
led to an amalgamation with the discourse around the adult pornography industry 
and “child pornography” was linked in the public eye with “the predatory 
activities of pedophiles and child sex rings”.16 There was, however, a legislative 
and judicial shift from the obscenity provisions regulating pornography generally 
to the child pornography-specific provision in s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code. The 
1984 Badgley Report on sexual offences against children (including child 
pornography) and the 1985 Fraser Report on pornography and prostitution both 
                                                                                                                                         
12 Butler, supra note 10 at para 44. 
13 Ibid at para 48 [emphasis in original]. 
14 Ibid at paras 59-61. 
15 Ibid at para 62. 
16 Smyth, supra note 9 at 76-77. 
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emphasized that the purpose of suppressing child pornography was to protect 
real children from sexual exploitation; the reports were not concerned with 
“imaginary representations of child sexual abuse.”17 The obscenity provision was 
tied to content, and thus did not directly address the primary concern about child 
pornography: the exploitation of children (who, unlike adults, cannot legally 
consent to participate) in producing certain materials.18 When Parliament drafted 
s. 163.1, however, the emphasis on harm to actual children that is apparent in 
both Butler and the Badgley and Fraser Reports was lost.   
Since 1993, child pornography has been defined for legal purposes in Canada 
by s. 163.1(1) of the Criminal Code. The legislative definition was broader than that 
previously used under obscenity law, in particular because it included what I will 
refer to as “fantasy” images and writings. By “fantasy” I mean those images, 
videos, recordings, or writings that do not depict, describe, or otherwise involve 
real children, a category that includes drawings, paintings, or computer-generated 
images, as well as “dress down” pornography, where an adult model is displayed 
to look like a minor.  
The original legal definition of child pornography enacted in 1993 captured 
a vast range of visual and a smaller range of print materials, only some of which 
directly involved children in their production.19 Today, the definition of child 
                                                                                                                                         
17 Ibid at 79-80. See also Ryder, supra note 9 at 111-13 (noting that not only Butler and the Badgley and Fraser 
Committee Reports, but also international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography focus on material that uses real 
children in producing sexual imagery). See generally Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution 
(Canada), Pornography and prostitution in Canada : report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution 
(Ottawa : Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985) [Fraser Report]; Committee on Sexual Offences 
Against Children and Youths (Canada), Sexual offences against children : report of the Committee on Sexual Offences 
Against Children and Youths (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984) [Badgley Report]; Lyne 
Casavant, James R Robertson, CIR 84-3E, “The Evolution of Pornography Law in Canada” (25 October 
2007), online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/843-
e.htm>. 
18 Smyth, supra note 9 at 80-81. 
19 Gary P Rodrigues, “CRANKSHAW-HIST 163.1” in Crankshaw’s Criminal Code of Canada (January 2015), 
online [my emphasis].  
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pornography at s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code has been further expanded.20 The 
definition now reads as follows: 
163.1 (1) In this section, “child pornography” means 
(a) a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether 
or not it was made by electronic or mechanical means, 
(i) that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of 
eighteen years and is engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit 
sexual activity, or 
(ii) the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual 
purpose, of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age 
of eighteen years; 
(b) any written material, visual representation or audio recording that 
advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of 
eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act; 
(c) any written material whose dominant characteristic is the description, for a 
sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that 
would be an offence under this Act; or 
(d) any audio recording that has as its dominant characteristic the description, 
presentation or representation, for a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person 
under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act. 21 
(italics showing additions from original 1993 definition; underlining is 
my emphasis) 
The later definition is broader than the original definition. While the 
inclusion of audio recordings simply reflects technological advancements, the 
amended definition retained the broad inclusion of representations of explicit 
child sexuality (i.e. fictional representations and dress down materials) but greatly 
expanded the provision for written materials, which is matched by the provision 
for audio recordings. The old definition included only written materials that 
                                                                                                                                         
20 This occurred through An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable persons) and the 
Canada Evidence Act, SC 2005, c 32, s 7(1). The 2005 amendments also imposed new mandatory minimum 
sentences on the various offences created in s. 163.1, which were further increased in 2012 by the Safe 
Streets and Communities Act, SC 2012, c 1. 
21 Criminal Code, supra note 1 at s 163.1 [underlining is my emphasis; italics show changes from the 1993 
provision]. 
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advocate or counsel sexual activity with a person under 18. By contrast, the new 
definition also includes material that is primarily about sexual activity with a 
person under the age of 18, regardless of whether it counsels or advocates such 
activity.  
The s. 163.1 definition captures virtually any material that would be sexually 
arousing to those who are attracted to persons under 18 years of age. The child 
pornography definition serves as the anchor for a series of offences including 
simple possession and accessing, as well as offences for making and distributing 
materials meeting this definition.22 The defences currently available under the 
provision are also narrower than they were originally, and would arguably be 
unavailable for persons other than artists, academics, medical practitioners, and 
scientific researchers.23  The practical effect of the provision is to deny sexual 
gratification through pornography to those attracted to persons under the legal 
age of majority and to criminalize those who seek such gratification. 
My analysis is focused on the hypothetical situation of a paedophile who 
possesses only (i) purely fictional or imaginary written or visual materials 
depicting or describing explicit child sexuality, or (ii) dress down pornography.24 
Although this person possesses child pornography within the Canadian 
definition, they are viewed and generally labelled not as a person who possesses 
child pornography, but rather as a paedophile. The problem is the narrative that 
                                                                                                                                         
22 These are Crown election offences that can be prosecuted as either summary conviction or indictable 
offences. In either form the offences carry mandatory minimum sentences. Criminal Code, supra note 1 at ss 
163.1(2)-(4.1). 
23 Substantive changes to the defences occurred in 2005, replacing the three original defences with a more 
stringent single defence that is less favourable to accused persons: An Act to amend the Criminal Code 
(protection of children and other vulnerable persons) and the Canada Evidence Act, SC 2005, c 32, s 7(7). The new 
defences require that the act have a “legitimate purpose related to the administration of justice or to 
science, medicine, education or art” and that the act “not pose an undue risk of harm to persons under the 
age of eighteen years”. Criminal Code, supra note 1 at s. 163.1(6). 
24 The latter situation is more problematic because it places an additional burden on the Crown to prove the 
subject in the material is not over 18 years of age. 
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quickly attaches to the label “paedophile.”25 As I will discuss in greater detail 
below, the Canadian definition of child pornography is implicitly linked to 
paedophilia, a medically-recognized mental illness, and yet the Canadian 
definition of child pornography captures a broader range of conduct than does 
the psychiatric diagnosis. 
For the sake of clarity, I will lay out the analytical steps that connect the ideas 
of child pornography and paedophilia. At its simplest, paedophilia – literally 
meaning child lover – is a status label that denotes a sexual arousal from or sexual 
attraction to children. While paedophilia is commonly thought of and is classified 
by the medical community as a mental disorder, the basic core of meaning 
indicates only a particular type of sexual desire; a paedophile is a person who has 
this desire. Putting legal definitions to one side, child pornography is sexually 
arousing content (visual, written or oral) that takes children as the object of focus.  
Although child pornography use can indicate paedophilia, there is not 
necessarily a causal connection or even a correlation between paedophilia and 
child sexual abuse or between child pornography use and child sexual abuse. 
Recent Canadian research tested the “intuitive link between possession of child 
pornography and pedophilia” and concluded that “child pornography offending 
is a valid diagnostic indicator of pedophilia”.26 The same study found, however, 
that “child pornography offending might be a stronger indicator of pedophilia 
than is sexually offending against a child”.27 I will discuss the current state of 
social scientific literature on the matter and the medical diagnostic criteria in 
greater detail below. For now, it is sufficient to note that paedophilia, child 
pornography, and child sexual abuse are often unquestioningly grouped together 
under the umbrella of paedophilia, despite important differences between them. 
In the social consciousness, however, this important distinction between 
paedophiles and child sexual offenders is rarely drawn. Viewers or users of child 
pornography are labelled as paedophiles, and a correlative assumption arises that 
paedophiles are viewers and users of child pornography. The associations go 
                                                                                                                                         
25 On a similar point, see Craig “Person(s) of Interest”, supra note 8; Craig, Troubling Sex, supra note 7. 
26 Michael C. Seto, James M. Cantor, and Ray Blanchard, “Child Pornography Are a Valid Diagnostic 
Indicator of Pedophilia” (2006) 115:3 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 610 at 610, 613. 
27 Ibid at 613.  
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further in two respects. First, child pornography is associated with harm to and 
exploitation of children (arising from both its production and a concern that it 
will be used to seduce children). Second, paedophilia is associated with sexual 
abuse and exploitation of children. Only the first step of this line of social 
reasoning is empirically supported, and then only in the context of pornography 
using real children.28 When these analytical jumps are put together, paedophiles 
pose a risk to children either (both) because they sexually abuse children or (and) 
because they contribute to the harms caused by child pornography, and they can 
be identified through their use of child pornography. The result is that a status 
label is associated with an act or acts (child sexual abuse and exploitation; 
consumption of child pornography). When those acts are criminalized, the chain 
of assumptions works backwards to criminalize a status. The law can therefore 
both arise from and confirm categorizations of acceptable and unacceptable 
sexuality.  
 Elaine Craig argues that essentialist understandings of sexuality pervade 
both social and legal discourse and create a binary between natural (normative) 
sexuality and deviant sexuality, with deviance being the subject of legal 
regulation.29 Craig argues that sexual identities are not inherently deviant, but 
rather deviance is socially produced through norms and discourse: discourse 
produces the subject about which it speaks, a process she refers to as “erotic 
speciation”.30 In Craig’s analysis, erotic speciation both applies to the criminal law 
treatment of paedophilia and provides the legal justification for protecting some 
sexual minorities but not others. The force driving this process is the search for 
a normative group identity that can only be defined in relation to what it is not.31  
Craig argues that the court looks at the paedophile as “a member of a 
discrete and identifiable sexual minority” and takes an essentialist approach based 
                                                                                                                                         
28 See above historical section. 
29 Craig, Troubling Sex, supra note 7 at 11-12. Essentialist conceptions of sexuality conceive of sexuality as 
“natural” and pre-social. Craig argues that conceptualizing sexuality as socially constructed better accounts 
for its complexity and thus facilitates better legal reasoning. Social constructivism posits that identity 
categories are created through discourse in an iterative process. Social constructivism does not mean that 
sexuality is a choice or is mutable, but rather is concerned with the social and legal implications of 
labelling. Ibid at 8-19. 
30 Ibid at 14. 
31 Ibid at 15. 
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on the identity category – a paedophile is seen as an “unnatural … sexual pervert”.32 
The concern is not with what a paedophile does, but with who they are, 
specifically in terms of their particular sexual desire.33 For Craig, this type of 
reasoning demonstrates the judicial reliance on an assessment of “an offender’s 
‘true nature’ or innate sexual disposition”.34 The danger is that this type of 
reasoning “risks convicting an accused for ‘being’ a paedophile”.35 In the context 
of child pornography, Craig asserts that the rationales for s. 163.1 are thematically 
linked by the idea that exposure to child pornography can incite paedophiles’ 
innate sexual orientation.36  
 Further evidence of this linkage between child pornography use, 
paedophilia, and child sexual offences and of the effective criminalization of a 
sexual status is evident upon examining the sentencing practices in child 
pornography cases. While s. 163.1 criminalizes the simple possession of even one 
image, regardless of the viewer’s subjective purpose,37 the accused being a 
paedophile is an aggravating factor for sentencing whereas the accused being 
deemed not a paedophile is a mitigating factor.38 The implicit logic is either that 
paedophiles are more likely to offend against children or that it is worse to look 
at child pornography and achieve sexual gratification than to look at child 
pornography and not achieve sexual gratification. Given this social and legal 
nexus between child pornography and paedophilia, the difference between 
medical definitions of paedophilia and the legal definition of child pornography 
is important to understand the implications of the law, and thus to assess whether 
the law is legitimate. 
                                                                                                                                         
32 Ibid at 24 (emphasis in original). 
33 Ibid at 33, 35. 
34 Ibid at 35. 
35 Ibid at 35. 
36 Ibid at 40. 
37 See e.g. R v Pressacco, 2010 SKQB 114 at para 22.  
38 See generally R v Hammond, 2013 BCSC 439 at para 68. See also R v Cuttell, 2010 ONCJ 139 at para 13-14; R 
v DLW, 2014 BCSC 43 at para 85-89. 
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Paedophilia is classified as a subset of paraphilia, which is listed in the DSM 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) as a mental illness. 
Paraphilia (the broader category) includes: “recurrent, intense sexually arousing 
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving […] iii) children or other 
non-consenting persons that occur over a period of at least 6 months.”39 
Paraphilic disorder is only diagnosed when atypical sexual behaviour or desire 
either (i) causes personal stress to the individual beyond that resulting from 
societal disapproval, or (ii) involves sexual desire or behaviour that involves 
another person’s psychological distress or injury or death, or a desire for sexual 
behaviour that involves unwilling persons or persons not legally able to consent.40  
The “personal stress” requirement acts as a limiting diagnostic factor, in that 
atypical sexual behaviour is only a disorder when it causes “clinically important 
distress, or impair[s] work, or cause[s] problems with social or personal 
functioning”.41 This requirement is still, however, subject to societal influences 
because impairment may be caused by the stigmatization associated with others 
knowing of the individual’s sexual interests or preferences.42 In effect, paraphilia 
diagnosis depends on criteria that can arise from societal disapproval.  
For paedophilia, the contingency is not only social but also legal. The 
diagnosis-limiting requirement is meaningless. There are two diagnostic 
indicators for paedophilia: (i) “recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, 
sexual urges, or behaviors involving activity with a prepubescent child or children 
(generally 13 years or younger)”, (ii) that persist for a minimum of 6 months.43 
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43 Lisa J Cohen and Igor Galynker, “Psychopathology and personality traits of pedophiles: issues for diagnosis 
and treatment” (2009) 26(6) Psychiatric Times 25, online: 
<http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/psychopathology-and-personality-traits-pedophiles>. 
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Paedophilia can never fall into merely the broader “atypical sexual behaviour or 
desire” category of paraphilia because it will always involve “persons not legally 
able to consent”.  
While it is not paedophilia per se that is criminalized by s. 163.1, the law acts 
to criminalize paedophiles who gratify their sexual desires through the use of child 
pornography.44 For my purposes, the critical aspects of the s. 163.1 definition are 
threefold. First, it includes visual representations and audio recordings involving 
real persons that are over the age of 18 and do not advocate or counsel sexual 
activity with someone under 18 that would be a criminal offence. Second, it 
includes visual representations that do not involve real persons at all (whether 
under or over the age of 18). Third, it includes written materials and audio 
recordings that do simulate or describe sexual activity with a person under the age 
of 18 and do so for a sexual purpose, but do not actually involve persons under 
the age of 18. In contrast to the definition of paedophilia in the DSM, the legal 
definition of child pornography captures material portraying children under the 
age of 18 years and even material that depicts an adult subject as being under the 
age of 18 years. Thus while the medical definition of paedophilia is partially 
contingent on the legal age of consent, the legal definition of child pornography 
captures a broader range of desire and conduct than is implied in the medical 
definition of paedophilia. 
The simultaneous connection and difference between the medical diagnostic 
criteria for paedophilia and the legal definition of child pornography is significant 
in light of Joel Feinberg’s query about the fine line between “sick” (ill) and “sick” 
(morally repugnant) in relation to crimes. Feinberg noted the phenomenon that 
“the more bizarre the crime, the stronger one’s inclination to think of the criminal 
as sick”, noting that this modern tendency runs counter to the historic legal and 
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moral recognition that (mental) sickness “[mitigates] culpability”.45 For Feinberg, 
using sickness to condemn behaviour “breeds paradox, for if the most immoral 
crimes are also the most sick, and the sickest crimes are those for which there is 
substantial mitigation, then it seems to follow that the worse the crime, the more 
forgiving we should be of the criminal”.46  
According to Feinberg, moral and psychiatric judgments blended in the 
modern era. As the number of recognized medical ailments expanded at the turn 
of the 20th century, medical authorities turned behaviours subject to moral 
opprobrium – such as drug addiction, homosexuality, and masturbation – into 
defined illnesses.47 Feinberg proposes that this process is self-reinforcing: 
pathologizing morally disapproved conduct reinforces the social conception that 
the conduct is abnormal and morally suspect.48 Simply put, the “merging of moral 
and psychiatric vocabularies […] in turn produced a blending of moral and 
psychiatric subject matters”.49 But because society evolves, whether a particular 
behaviour or characteristic is socially frowned upon or considered an illness can 
change.50 Paedophilia is a perfect example. 
Recognizing the difficulty in differentiating “between deviant sexual desires 
arising from mental disorders and displays of sexual orientation that do not 
emerge from a form of mental illness” led the DSM-V to attempt to clearly 
delineate paraphilia from paraphilic disorder.51 Medical practitioners and 
scientists recognize the socially contingent nature of the definition and diagnostic 
criteria and the overlap between medical/psychiatric versus social, political, and 
legal spheres. As McManus et al note, “[d]ue to societal shift in what is defined 
as sexually deviant the use of ‘paraphilic’ has significantly changed over time, and 
within cultures”.52 As a result, diagnoses may not be rooted in actual psychiatric 
health, and those who are identified as having these desires may be stigmatized 
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48 Ibid at 198. 
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or caused personal distress, which can then act as evidence satisfying the 
diagnostic criteria for paraphilic disorder, in a loop that fits neatly into Feinberg’s 
model.53 Where psychiatric diagnoses are repurposed and used – often 
inappropriately – as the basis for criminal culpability or civil commitment post-
incarceration, the result can be troubling: individuals are incarcerated or kept 
under state control because their sexuality violates societal norms.54  A simple and 
pertinent example outside the context of paedophilia is homosexuality, which 
until 1973 was classified as paraphilic under the DSM, and has now not only been 
delisted, but is a Charter-protected ground of discrimination.55  
 Feinberg’s observations about the mingling of criminality, pathology, and 
morality are apposite to paedophilia and child pornography. Users (and 
producers, etc.) of child pornography are seen as perverted, twisted, and “sick.”56 
The presumed exploitation of children for personal gratification is seen as 
immoral. Paedophiles are not only socially reviled, but can be classified as 
mentally ill. Moreover, where law is directed at sanctioning (im)moral conduct, it 
is not just a blending of social and psychiatric judgments, but a blending of social, 
legal, and psychiatric ways of understanding.57 
Psychiatric, social and legal definitions blur in the child 
pornography/paedophilia context. The legal definition that will attach the public 
label “paedophile” to a person is broader than the psychiatric definition (because 
in Canada, a single instance of possession is criminalized and the “child” 
threshold is 18 years). And in the social narrative, paedophile is synonymous with 
contact offences, or at least the risk thereof. As I discuss in greater detail below, 
the judicial rationalization of Canada’s child pornography law similarly posits a 
causal connection between child pornography and contact offences. The 
institutional status of the legal system gives the legal definition a legitimating 
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power but also imposes an additional level of collective and state-sanctioned 
moral opprobrium. Thus while the line between the legal definition of child 
pornography and the psychiatric definition of paedophilia is blurry, the legal 
definition and criminalization of child pornography also builds into a social 
narrative. This legal aspect attaches greater stigma to sexual desire for children 
than may be deserved, both because the legal definition does not differentiate 
between the various types of material caught in the definition and because of the 
social and legal narrative that draws a causal connection between child 
pornography and contact offences against children.58 Recognizing the 
relationship between medical and legal definitions and the influence of social 
values on each is important because it suggests the social contingency of what is 
considered deviant versus acceptable desire and conduct in both medical and legal 
contexts. This category of deviance arises from the interaction between majority 
moral values, psychiatry, and law. If the social contingency of the concept is 
recognized, it is easier to question the implications of these definitions for those 
who are labelled by them and thus to envision changing them to minimize 
negative effects. 
Paedophiles are a socially reviled group. Judicial, academic, and political 
speech evidences a general prejudice towards paedophiles.59 Majority prejudice of 
this nature undoubtedly affects the ability to pay respectful attention to and 
comprehend the reasons that can be given on the other side of the issue. As I will 
discuss, this violates a condition of deliberative democracy and also undermines 
the ability to conduct an effective s. 1 justification analysis.60 A few examples of 
this prejudice are opposite. 
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 Judges and academics have drawn parallels between paedophilia and hate 
speech, demonstrating the severity of opprobrium that attaches to paedophiles. 
In Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, Rothstein J considered 
whether certain flyers were hate speech and thus violated provincial human rights 
legislation.61 Two of the flyers were found to satisfy the hate speech definition in 
part because they “[delegitimize] homosexuals by referring to them as filthy or 
dirty sex addicts and by comparing them to pedophiles, a traditionally reviled 
group in society”.62 Rothstein J reiterated this hierarchy of statuses when he 
noted, “The flyers also seek to vilify those of same-sex orientation by portraying 
them as child abusers or predators”.63 Rothstein J held that it was reasonable to 
conclude that “by equating homosexuals with […] pedophiles and predators who 
would proselytize vulnerable children and cause their premature death, [the flyers] 
would objectively be seen as exposing homosexuals to detestation and 
vilification”.64 In the academic context, Janine Benedet has equated all child 
pornography with hate speech.65  
 Even more recently, and in the political context, Conservative Canadian 
Senator Donald Plett derogatorily characterized paedophiles as opportunistic 
offenders when speaking about Bill C-279.66 In discussing whether transgender 
people should be allowed to use bathrooms corresponding to their gender 
identity, Sen. Plett asserted that the bill “allows for pedophiles to take advantage 
of legislation that we have in place”.67 His concern was not that transgender 
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people would abuse the legislation but rather that paedophiles would, revealing 
how gender or sexual deviance is associated in many people’s minds with 
paedophilia and with risk to public safety.68  
 The harm to paedophiles is not, however, limited to general social 
revulsion due to the possible ramifications of a child pornography conviction. As 
I have already discussed, a determination that the accused in a child pornography 
case is a paedophile is an aggravating factor for the purpose of sentencing. R v K 
(M) illustrated both the social and legal consequences of a possession for fantasy 
child pornography.69 
 K. M. pled guilty to possession of child pornography in the form of 
“cartoon-like depictions and pencil drawings of young children (toddlers)” 
showing “sexual acts between children, between children and adults, acts of 
bondage, torture and bestiality” which “the sentencing judge described as ‘vile’ 
acts” and the Court of Appeal called “disturbing and alarming”.70 K. M. was 
sentenced to 90 days of jail time, a three-year probation wherein he was 
prohibited from being alone with a child under the age of 16 years and an order 
preventing him to attending certain public places where children at typically 
found, including day cares, for 10 years (which prevented K.M. from being alone 
with his three-year-old daughter or taking her to day care).71 In addition to these 
legal consequences, however, K. M. and his wife agreed that he should move out 
of the family home to “[guard] the family from the stigma of his conviction”.72  
 The New Brunswick Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed K.M.’s 
appeal, having refused to admit fresh evidence.73 In concluding that the requisite 
nexus between the probation conditions and either the offence, or “the 
protection of society and the offender’s reintegration into society” was present, 
the court imposed an extremely low threshold for demonstrating that the 
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offender posed a risk of harm to children beyond the mere fact of conviction.74 
Although conviction itself was insufficient to establish the required nexus, it was 
sufficient that the images were “disturbing” and K. M. had kept the pictures for 
over seven years.75 The lynchpin was the nature of the images – they were cartoon 
drawings of toddlers engaged in sexual acts with adults.76 
 The court’s dismissal of K. M.’s request to admit fresh evidence similarly 
fixated on the nature of the images. While the court acknowledged its limited 
capacity to assess the relationship between possession of child pornography, 
paedophilia, and deviant sexual behaviour, it nevertheless concluded that a clinical 
and forensic psychologist’s report concluding that K.M. was not a paedophile and 
that the “risk … is so low … that to prevent the father from normally interacting 
with his daughter may be actually damageable to the family dynamics, and 
ultimately the child as well” was “deficient” and could not affect the result.77 They 
rejected the report in part because the psychologist had not reviewed the images 
in question and thus had not seen “[t]he depravity” of the drawings, which in the 
Court’s opinion “[could not] be translated into words”.78  
 In short, despite having adverted to the Court’s lack of expertise in 
assessing the nexus between child pornography and pedophilia, the Court went 
on to conclude that the deviant character of the images was sufficient extra 
evidence to establish a risk of harm to children. In doing so, the Court treated the 
logical leap between viewing child pornography and offences against children as 
sufficiently self-evident to provide the basis for imposing conditions on K. M.’s 
probation.  
 Even where paedophiles and child pornography users are not subject to 
criminal charges, they suffer as a result of social stigmatization and the risk of 
legal sanctions. This leads paedophiles to self-censor and prevents them from 
obtaining therapeutic support.79  
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Numerous scholars have emphasized that the idea of paedophilia is a social 
construction that serves to affirm normative social structures and create a moral 
rallying point.80 Without suggesting that social construction can never provide a 
basis for moral judgment, recognizing the socially constructed nature of an 
identity category is an important first step to analyzing the bases for and 
implications of that categorization. Elise Chenier suggests that the parallel 
between the historic medical and legal treatment of homosexuality and the 
current treatment of paedophilia indicate that in the 1970s, the latter took the 
former’s place as a category against which the “norm” is defined.81 Still, there are 
important distinctions to be recognized between homosexuality and paedophilia. 
Destigmatizing paedophilia requires a line drawing exercise that is not necessary 
with homosexuality. While homosexuality was historically vilified both in terms 
of desire and act, both are now arguably socially accepted. By contrast, while 
paedophilic desire need not be vilified, child sexual abuse is a different matter. 
Similarly to Chenier, Harris Mirkin argues that the equation of 
representations of child sexuality with paedophilia and sexual abuse affirm the 
ideological concept of innocence that exists as a moral standard in modern 
pluralistic society.82 Mirkin proposes that repressing child pornography creates a 
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moral rallying point for various social groups while also legitimizing increasing 
government intrusions into private life, thus both creating and policing normative 
society.83 David Gurnham goes so far as to suggest that “the demonization and 
scapegoating of the paedophile is convenient cover for the mainstream society to 
unreflectively indulge its own eroticization of children through the innocence 
fetish”.84 The spectre of the paedophile serves to “allow adults to look with a 
paedophilic gaze on [children’s] bodies, safe in the knowledge that the real 
paedophiles are monstrous perverts who have nothing to do with us”.85 
Elaine Craig treads a similar path, arguing that the “harm” of paedophilia, 
like the idea of the paedophile, is socially constructed.86 In short, what is harmful 
depends on what a society deems harmful, but once it is so conceived the harm 
becomes real in the context of that society. 87 If we accept that both the “harm” 
and the “paedophile” are socially constructed (i.e. contextual and socially 
contingent), a determination that the harm should be alleviated presents two 
alternatives. We can regulate the alleged source of the harm, or take a systemic 
approach to changing the social context that produces one or both.88 In the 
paedophilia and child pornography context, we have taken the former rather than 
the latter. By defining paedophiles (child pornography users) as a discrete category 
of individuals with an innate disposition that is “different in kind” from most of 
society, the judicial approach obscures the reality that the majority of child sexual 
abuse is committed by family members.89 As a result, policy discussions and legal 
regulation take the wrong focus, emphasizing protection from the other by 
identification and containment rather than protection from the family by 
addressing the social factors that contribute to child sexual abuse.90  
Legal and policy discussions are, along with judicial reasons and legislative 
action and enforcement, a form of deliberation by which the contract that 
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governs relationships between citizens and between citizens and government is 
formed. Social context both informs and is informed by both the deliberation and 
the resultant laws. Provided the deliberation meets certain conditions, citizens 
agree to be bound by the law and the law is considered legitimate. 
Deliberative democracy is a theoretical framework that posits reasoned 
deliberation between equal parties as a precondition for the creation of legitimate 
laws. The framework can also be used to assess the legitimacy of a law that is 
already in existence. Deliberative democracy91 proposes a solution to the dilemma 
of making laws that bind all citizens in a pluralistic society, where it is inevitable 
that various individuals and groups will have different conceptions of the 
conditions and requirements for a good social order – what is often referred to 
as “the good life.”92 This theory is particularly suited to assessing Canadian law 
because the Charter can be seen as a constitutionally-entrenched attempt to 
achieve these conditions. Government action is limited by certain fundamental 
rights and freedom granted to citizens, who are given a voice through each of the 
democratically-elected legislature that creates the laws that will bind the citizens, 
the executive who carry out these laws, and the judiciary who hold both branches 
the rule of law. By legitimacy, therefore, I mean law that accords with Canadian 
constitutional values. The relationship between deliberative democracy and the 
Charter is, in my assessment, an iterative one. While the Charter can in some cases 
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be a vehicle to secure the fundamental preconditions of equality and respect, the 
evolving content of particular Charter rights is also socially contingent. Thus in 
other cases, a deliberative democratic process may be required to extend Charter 
protections where they were previously denied. 
Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the internal relation between law and 
democracy posits that private and public autonomy must co-exist. For Habermas, 
the democratic procedure is the sole legitimating mechanism of a law-making 
process in a pluralistic context.93 A law is only legitimate “if all those possibly 
affected by it could consent to it after participating in rational discourses”.94 
Legitimacy requires that laws arise from a structure of rational (reasons-based) 
communicative consultation among all affected parties, each of whom must hold 
a position of equality in relation to the others. Since law is changeable at the 
impetus of the political sovereign, for its coercive force to be legitimate it must 
guarantee the equal autonomy of all legal persons.95 Two forms of autonomy are 
crucial to legitimate a legal system: “the individual liberties of the subject of 
private law and the public autonomy of citizens”.96 They exist in a “reciprocal 
relation”, because “legal persons can be autonomous only insofar as they can 
understand themselves, in the exercise of their civic rights, as authors of just those 
rights which they are supposed to obey as addressees”.97 Citizens are “co-
legislators” but must participate within the constraints of institution which they 
define – their mode of communication is circumscribed by the system in which 
they communicate, and yet if they respect those constraints any and all aspects of 
the system are open to disagreement and potential change.98 Habermas concludes 
that “[t]he private autonomy of equally entitled citizens can be secured only 
insofar as citizens actively exercise their civic autonomy”.99 In other words, it is 
up to the citizen, acting within the constraints of the democratic institution, to 
assert their rights through the deliberative mechanism. Habermas, however, failed 
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to account for certain characteristics of real-world pluralistic society: various 
sectors of society not be equal or able to communicate with one another. 
Melissa S. Williams ascribes to Habermasian deliberative democracy, but 
addresses Habermas’ failure to account for the challenge of including 
marginalized groups’ voices.100 Ideal theory stumbles in the real world because 
the pre-conditions of deliberative democracy (equality of participants and 
deliberation based on reasons) are barriers to meaningful (transformative) 
participation by marginalized groups. Deliberative democracy requires that 
participants attempt to persuade one another about “the common good” (i.e. 
moral agreement about shared aspects of socio-political life) – both what it is and 
what it requires – using “moral or ethical” reasons that others can accept and which 
are grounded in “what is common rather than what is particular to individual or 
group”.101 The trouble arises from the social contingency of reasons, which 
necessitates permitting marginalized groups to present partial arguments. 
Social context is crucially important to deliberative democracy because it 
shapes both who will be heard and what will count as reasons. Williams proposes 
that “whether or not citizens will recognize others’ reasons as reasons may be a 
socioculturally contingent matter” and that this contingency “may tend to be 
resolved in a manner that systematically disadvantages the reasons of 
marginalized groups”.102 Put more simply, so long as deliberative democracy takes 
institutional and individual impartiality as an unexamined theoretical pre-
condition, it may produce more sound political judgments (in the sense that the 
full implications of a decision will be better understood), but will tend to reinforce 
the status quo by privileging the interests and reasons of the already-privileged 
majority.103 Unless deliberative democracy takes explicit account of the problems 
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posed for marginalized groups, it cannot offer a “model of justice towards 
marginalized groups”.104  
Two major issues arise under the standard conception of deliberative 
democracy: (i) “what counts as a reason for the purposes of political 
deliberation”, and (ii) whether participants and institutions are able to achieve the 
promised ends of participant equality.105 The first issue is that marginalized 
groups’ reasons may not be recognized as reasonable, and thus could be 
discounted as falling outside the rubric of deliberation: “the recognition of 
marginalized groups’ reasons as reasons for (or acceptable to) other citizens is a highly 
contingent matter […]”.106 Assessing reasonableness is contingent in a way 
“structured along the lines of social privilege and disadvantage”.107 The result is 
that “[w]hat deliberators could accept as reasons may turn out to depend 
importantly on who they are and on who is presenting the reasons to them”.108  
The problem is especially acute where the point of disagreement in the 
deliberative process is “the social meaning of existing practices”.109 This is because in 
that context, “the reasons that undergird marginalized groups’ critique of the 
practice do not function as reasons for members of privileged groups, because the social 
meaning of the practice for the marginalized group is (at least initially) inaccessible 
to them”.110 Williams concludes that this is especially so where “the privileged 
group’s interpretation of the practice has the consequence of reinforcing their 
position of relative advantage.”111 Thus Williams proposes that deliberative 
democracy can only achieve its ends if members of these groups are given special 
dispensation within the deliberative framework to espouse the merits of their 
position from a partial, as opposed to an impartial, manner. 
Williams’ extension of Habermas’ framework solves some problems, but 
fails to address two of particular concern to my argument. First, Williams seems 
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to presume that identity categories or groups are fixed entities that can either be 
identified or will identify themselves. As such, she avoids the question of the 
shifting recognition of particular identity categories as legitimate or illegitimate, 
deserving of protection or not. Second, she does not address the situation where 
a group who ought to benefit from the special dispensation to speak partially are 
unable to use their voice because to espouse their position is to risk social and 
legal sanction and even violence. The two issues interrelate, as those in the second 
dilemma cannot attempt to assert the legitimacy of their identity category, such 
that they cannot then go on to advocate from a partial position for rights or 
protections. 
The paedophile exemplifies both these limitations: they are not perceived as 
a legitimate identity group (as are, for instance, homosexuals or women or 
persons of Aboriginal descent), nor can they safely advocate for status as such a 
legitimate identity group. Paedophiles cannot advocate for their rights because 
they cannot disclose their status – even to a therapist112 – for fear of social and 
legal sanctions.113 Moreover, as I will discuss, the legislative debates demonstrate 
that this perspective was conspicuously absent from the discussions on the 
breadth and effect of what became s. 163.1. This elephantine void indicates the 
necessity for some mechanism to include the voices of those whose interests will 
be affected, but who do not have the social capital to achieve the social and 
political mobilization that Williams sees as a necessary precondition to 
marginalized groups’ capacity to effect change in the system that oppresses them. 
 Writing from the standpoint of freedom of expression, Mirkin has 
explicitly addressed one facet of the democratic exclusion of paedophiles. Mirkin 
argues that child pornography ought to be brought back under the general 
obscenity test because pornography can serve as a socio-political rallying point 
for persons with deviant sexual desires.114 He reasons that the obscenity criteria 
“[recognize] that there is frequently a political and social content to sexual speech 
                                                                                                                                         
112 See generally Olshan, supra note 79. In the Canadian context, see e.g. Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990 
c. c.11, s. 72, Children and Family Services Act, SNS 1990, c 5, ss 23-24, Child, Family and Community Service Act, 
RSBC 1996 c 46, ss. 13-14. 
113 See generally Cooper, supra note 54; Olshan, supra note 79. 
114 While Mirkin writes in the US context and thus the specifics of his legal analysis are not directly applicable 
to the Canadian context, his broader analysis is relevant. 
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and images, and that sexual speech is different from sexual behavior”.115 Mirkin 
asserts that “[i]n sexual politics, pornography serves many of the functions of 
political speech”, particularly for sexual minorities.116 Organizing around their 
sexual preferences through pornography “serves as an important symbolic 
community identifier” for members of sexual minorities that brings sexual 
interests into the light and allows the individual to identify with them.117 In effect, 
Mirkin proposes that identity can only coalesce in a community, which suggests 
that the effect of driving socio-politically unpopular identities underground is to 
squelch their development.  
Mirkin’s point about the political-silencing effect of child pornography 
suppression speaks directly to my argument about the (il)legitimacy of Canadian 
child pornography law under the deliberative discourse model. The law creates 
and contributes to barriers that prevent paedophiles from achieving the level of 
collective organization that Williams proposes is required for marginalized groups 
to meaningfully assert their position in the deliberative democratic framework. 
Moreover, the comparison Mirkin draws to other marginalized groups (e.g. race, 
ethnicity, etc.) support my argument for s. 7 and s. 15 bases of protecting 
paedophiles.118  
 I adopt Williams’ development of deliberative democracy, but applying 
it in the context of paedophilia and Canada’s child pornography law creates a new 
challenge: finding a way to create conditions that would permit an unbiased 
assessment of the validity of the assumptions that lead to the social stigma and 
legal risk associated with disclosing one’s status as a paedophile. Only then can 
the parameters required to manage risk of harm to children be defined in a way 
that maximizes the sexual equality and integrity of paedophiles while protecting 
children from sexual abuse and exploitation.  
                                                                                                                                         
115 Mirkin, supra note 4 at 258 
116 Ibid at 258 
117 Ibid at 258-59. Mirkin analogizes this process to the feminist idea that the personal is political. 
118 C.f. Chenier, supra note 9 (making a similar connection in the conclusion of her historical analysis of 
paedophilia). 
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 Research can circumvent the problem of reasons recognition because it 
is a socially accepted form of reasons. Williams argued that deliberative 
democracy as described by Habermas failed to account for the position of 
marginalized groups in society, and I have extended her analysis in analyzing the 
position of paedophiles. In current society, research holds special weight because 
of its relative objectivity and verifiability. Thus where a particular group, such as 
paedophiles, are not recognized by the social majority as deserving of an equal 
voice or their reasons are not seen as reasons, and where social conditions prevent 
their coalescing to pressure the majority (as proposed by Williams), research as 
reasons offers a viable alternative for ensuring their perspective is heard in the 
deliberative democratic debate.  
 When s. 163.1 was before Parliament, paedophiles had no voice in the 
democratic process. Though those directly affected by criminal laws are perhaps 
not usually consulted, s. 163.1 is a special case for two reasons. First, being a 
paedophile is a sexual identity and is not inherently criminal, but is socially vilified. 
Consulting paedophiles on a law that expanded the meaning of child pornography 
and thus restricted their ability to achieve sexual gratification is not ludicrous – it 
is akin to consulting dog owners when drafting a new by-law that would increase 
the number of parks prohibiting off-leash pets.119  
Second, affected parties – with the exception of paedophiles – were consulted 
during the legislative process. The Standing Committee heard from 13 witnesses, 
including two Department of Justice members, two police force members, a 
children’s rights advocate, and numerous representatives of the expressive 
                                                                                                                                         
119 Ryder has also argued this point. Ryder’s critique of Canada’s child pornography law centres on the law’s 
inclusion of imaginary materials that neither counsel nor advocate sexual offences against children and 
failure to distinguish them from those that involve actual exploitation or children or advocacy for such 
exploitation. Ryder intimates that Canada’s child pornography law is the product of stigmatizing social 
influences, as opposed to sound democratic consideration or judicial review of legislative excess. Ryder, 
supra note 9 at 103-04, 108-09, 114-17. 
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community.120 Regardless of the usual conditions for drafting criminal laws, in 
the case of s. 163.1 representatives of those who would be affected by the law 
were consulted, with the exception of paedophiles, despite the fact that they were 
most directly affected. The Parliamentary proceedings are rife with highly partial 
commentary that equates child pornography users with persons who commit 
child sexual abuse. They are also distinctly lacking in social scientific evidence, 
and instead rely heavily on anecdotal testimony.  
The Parliamentary debates from the 2nd reading of the Bill demonstrate 
animosity towards paedophiles and draw a link between child pornography use 
and child molestation. In introducing the Bill, Rob Nicholson specifically 
addressed the inclusion of materials depicting adults as being under the age of 18, 
stating that the underlying concern was that “pseudo child pornography” 
“promotes the sexual abuse of children”.121 Similarly, in the Senate debate on June 
17, 1993, Sen. Duncan Jessiman referred to the “main purpose” in terms 
indicating that the main thrust of the bill was not to capture fantasy materials, but 
rather to capture materials depicting real persons, and particularly real children.122  
The concerns raised about the bill in the House of Commons were primarily 
that the definition was not broad enough.123 The language used by 
Parliamentarians belies prejudice: Ron MacDonald felt that “everybody would 
agree that people who exploit children for a sexual purpose and for profits are 
pretty despicable and low lifes” and referred to the purpose of the legislation as 
“to try to stop the bottom dwelling, pond scum who exploit our children 
sexually”.124 This illustrates that not only general society but also the democratic 
representatives responsible for vetting s. 163.1 were both prejudiced against the 
target group and drew a causal connection between child pornography users and 
child sexual abusers. 
                                                                                                                                         
120 House of Commons Debates, “Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice 
and the Solicitor General” No 104 (8 June 1993), No 105 (10 June 1993), No 106 (15 June 1993) 
[“Standing Committee Minutes”]. 
121 House of Commons Debates, 34th Parl 2nd Sess, Vol 16 (3 June 1993) at 20329 (Rob Nicholson). 
122 Debates of the Senate, 34th Parl 3rd Sess, Vol 4 (17 June 1993) at 3579 (Hon Duncan James Jessiman).  
123 House of Commons Debates, supra note 122 at 20331, 20333, 20335.  
124 House of Commons Debates, supra note 122 at 20332-33 (Ron MacDonald).  
56 AN ANALYSIS OF CANADA’S CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW Vol. 25 
 
 In the Standing Committee, Detective Staff Sergeant Robert Matthews 
of the Ontario Provincial Police’s Pornography and Hate Literature Section 
similarly claimed that “you cannot have child pornography without having child 
abuse” and equated pedophiles with child abusers, defining “a pedophile” as “an 
individual who has taken that step and has started to sexually exploit and sexually 
abuse children”.125 Det. Sgt. Matthews highlighted “that [child pornography is] 
used to satisfy the pedophile’s sexual fantasies” as one of its dangers.126  This 
latter point is significant, because it supports my contention that despite the law 
being facially aimed at child pornography because of harm to children, there is a 
strong undercurrent of criminalizing the fact of sexual desire for children.  
 By contrast, representatives of the expressive community emphasized 
concerns about the overbreadth of the bill and its potential to curb free 
expression. Alan Borovoy of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association expressed 
concern over the “overbreadth of the bill, the fact that it goes much beyond 
merely involving real youngsters in real sexual activity”, though his concerns were 
targeted to literary and dramatic works.127 In particular, Mr. Borovoy highlighted 
the lack of evidence supporting the hypothesis that persons exposed to child 
pornography “might be influenced to do some awful things”, an evidentiary hole 
acknowledged by those producing psychological literature because of “the 
inadequacy of the studies, the inadequacy of evidence that any significant number 
of people are actually adversely affected by this material”.128 These voices, 
however, had no effect on the wording of the bill. The tone of the discussions 
suggests that such concerns fell on deaf ears. 
Witness’ language illustrates the vituperation and moral opprobrium 
attaching to paedophiles. Det. Sgt. Matthews defined child pornography as 
including nude or partially nude photographs depicting children in “unnatural 
poses”, but not “natural pictures” such as family photographs of a nude child on 
a beach. This builds into other scholars’ analyses of how “the paedophile” is used 
                                                                                                                                         
125 House of Commons Debates, “Standing Committee Minutes”, No 106, supra note 121 at 4, 8. 
126 Ibid at 4-5.   
127 Ibid at 8, 11-13. See also Mr. Jack Gray of the Writers’ Guild of Canada, ibid at 36, 38. 
128 Ibid at 10-11.  
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to construct and enforce normative sexualities.129 Similarly, Monica Rainey, 
President of Citizens Against Child Exploitation, showed certain examples of 
child pornography to the Standing Committee to “show you the sickening, 
disgusting viewpoint of those who assault children” and demonstrate “how really 
twisted it is”.130 Both Det. Sgt. Matthews and Ms. Rainey’s choice of language 
reflects the assumed conjunction of child pornography with child sexual abuse as 
well as the convergence of morality and illness discussed by Joel Feinberg. 
Sexually deviant material is seen as morally repulsive and is characterized as 
“sick”. Detective Wolff of the Pornography Investigation Division from the 
Vancouver Police Department further distanced paedophiles from normative 
sexuality by highlighting that Mack’s Leathers, a Vancouver company dealing in 
leather, bondage, and sexual aids for adults, “feels that with stuff dealing with 
children, something needs to be done”.131 By marking out a hierarchy of sexual 
deviance, Det. Wolff positioned paedophilia as the polar opposite of normative 
sexuality. What these witness’ language illustrates is not only that there was no 
voice for paedophiles in the Parliamentary drafting process, but also that 
Williams’ concern about the inability of marginalized groups to gain a place and 
to have their reasons understood as reasons is apposite in this context.   
Furthermore, both Parliamentarians and witnesses raised concerns about the 
rushed legislative process and the failure to adequately consult affected groups. 
In the House of Commons, Ian Waddell expressed concern about the effect of 
freedom of expression and adverted to the need for “[i]nclusive justice” meaning 
that “people from all sides come in and discuss the bill”.132 Numerous witnesses 
similarly raised concerns about the limited scope of the consultation process. For 
instance, Sandra MacDonald, President of the Canadian Film and Television 
Production Association, concluded her submissions to the Standing Committee 
by saying, “There was, to the best of our knowledge, no prior consultation on the 
text of this legislation with either the legal community or affected parties, such as 
                                                                                                                                         
129 See e.g. Craig, Troubling Sex, supra note 7; Ost, supra note 9; Gurnham, supra note 9; Chenier, supra note 9. 
See above text accompanying notes 80-90. 
130 House of Commons Debates, “Standing Committee Minutes”, No 105, supra note 120 at 11. See also “most 
sickening stories”, “how sick it really is”, “these sick people”, and “It’s not natural”. Ibid at 12, 24, 27at 20. 
131 Ibid at 25-26. 
132 House of Commons Debates, supra note 121 at 20333-35 (Ian Waddell). 
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our members.”133 While these voices were not referencing the need to consult 
paedophiles or other child pornography users, the fact that they could raise these 
types of deliberative-inclusion concerns without intending to include those 
parties emphasizes the complete exclusion. This was further highlighted by the 
only references to paedophile or child pornography voices in the process. 
The only references to any voice for paedophiles or their representatives 
were expressed in terms of the need for exclusion. Sen. Jessiman adverted to the 
North America Men-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA)134 as a “disgusting 
publication” and argued that inclusion of images of people over 18 depicted as 
being under 18 was necessary because it promoted publications like NAMBLA’s 
newspaper.135 In the Standing Committee, Department of Justice representatives 
explicitly rejected any influence from advocacy by interest groups like NAMBLA, 
while Det. Sgt. Matthews, Det. Noreen Wolff, and Ms. Rainey expressed the view 
that written materials needed to be included in the definition of child 
pornography specifically to suppress bulletins published by NAMBLA.136 Det. 
Wolff denounced NAMBLA as “an organization of child molesters” who 
“continually align themselves with the gay community in an attempt to legitimize 
their organization”.137 These were the only mentions of any input from 
representative of the potential users of child pornography or their representatives, 
and were cast in negative and exclusionary terms.  
The ability to amend legislation does not excuse the failure to conduct an 
adequate deliberative process, in particular because of the heated socio-political 
context surrounding child pornography. Sen. Jessiman commented that “[t]his 
legislation is not carved in stone. If improved legislation can be suggested, I am 
sure the government of the day – whichever government is in power – will 
                                                                                                                                         
133 House of Commons Debates, “Standing Committee Minutes”, No 106, supra note 120 at 19. See also ibid at 22 
(Gerald A. Flaherty of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation). 
134 NAMBLA is an advocacy organization that promotes removal of age of consent laws, issues numerous 
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137 Ibid at 16.  
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listen”.138 Given the climate that surrounds child pornography and child sexual 
abuse, Sen. Jessiman’s conviction seems misplaced. The fact that every 
amendment to s. 163.1 has made the provision more rather than less restrictive 
suggests that Sen. Jessiman was indeed mistaken.   
This complete exclusion calls into question the legitimacy of the law when 
examined from a deliberative democracy standpoint. Under that framework, 
deliberation between all those who could be affected by a law is a prerequisite to 
legitimacy. Where the group most significantly affected by a law was neither 
present nor represented, the law’s legitimacy is suspect. There was no 
representative for paedophiles invited to speak before Parliament when they 
drafted s. 163.1, a law that targets users of child pornography and thus by 
extension paedophiles. While it is not to be expected that those affected by 
criminal laws will be consulted at every amendment, s. 163.1 was a brand new 
criminal provision. Moreover, other stakeholders were invited to comment on 
the proposed law. In this context, the exclusion of any voice for paedophiles 
raises democratic concerns. In the Canadian system, however, the courts are 
another forum for deliberation and inclusion and provide a legitimacy check in 
that those charged under a law can challenge the constitutionality of that law. For 
s. 163.1, Sharpe should have provided that check.  
R v Sharpe remains the definitive case on Canada’s child pornography 
provision, despite subsequent amendments to s. 163.1. McLachlin CJC wrote the 
majority reasons, concluding that although the s. 163.1(4) prohibition on the 
simple possession of child pornography infringed the freedom of expression 
guarantee in s. 2(b) of the Charter, the infringement was justified “given the harm 
possession of child pornography can cause to children” provided two exceptions 
were read into the legislation and the defences were broadly interpreted.139 These 
two exceptions were: (i) possession of “self-created expressive material … created 
                                                                                                                                         
138 Debates of the Senate, supra note 122 at 3699 (Hon Duncan James Jessiman). 
139 Sharpe, supra note 2 at paras 2, 5, 60. Both the trial judge and the majority in the British Columbia Court of 
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by the accused alone, and held by the accused alone, exclusively for his or her 
own personal use”, and (ii) “private recordings of lawful sexual activity … created 
by or depicting the accused, provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity 
and is held by the accused for exclusively private use”.140141 While the Sharpe court 
may have correctly assessed the provision’s constitutionality given the manner in 
which it framed the constitutional question and because of the then applicable 
standard of justification under s. 1, I propose that a deliberative democratic lens 
exposes the deficiencies in both s. 163.1 and the judicial reasoning that upheld 
it.142   
McLachlin CJC noted that the s. 163.1(1) definition of child pornography 
captured “any non-textual representation that can be perceived visually”.143 On 
the issue of whether the definition caught imaginary persons, McLachlin CJC 
concluded that “[t]he available evidence suggests that explicit sexual materials can 
be harmful whether or not they depict actual children. Moreover, with the quality 
of contemporary technology, it can be very difficult to distinguish a ‘real’ person 
from a computer creation or composite” and thus to achieve Parliament’s 
purpose of protecting against a “reasoned risk of harm to children” “both actual 
and imaginary human beings” were included.144 An objective approach was 
adopted for each of “depicted”, “explicit sexual activity”, and “dominant 
characteristic” and “sexual purpose”.145  
McLachlin CJC for the majority framed the dilemma as one of balancing 
privacy and freedom of expression on the one hand against protecting children 
from “the evils associated with the possession of child pornography” on the 
                                                                                                                                         
140 Ibid at para 115. This second exemption was defined to defend against the risk of criminalizing self-
recorded depictions of sexual activity between adolescents. 
141 Ibid at para 60.  
142 Janine Benedet offers a counterpoint to my argument that the Sharpe court erred by upholding the 
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143 Sharpe, supra note 2 at para 35. 
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other.146 By contrast, L’Heureux-Dubé J for the minority concluded that child 
pornography has “no social value” and “only a tenuous connection to the value 
of self-fulfilment” and thus warranted “only attenuated protection”.147 On both 
the majority and minority view, the bulk of the court’s work fell under the s. 1 
justification analysis. 
 Section 1 allows the government to justify a law that infringes on citizens’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Section 1 is about the government being 
permitted to act in ways that infringe on an individual’s rights and freedom to 
protect the equality of all citizens. Under the Oakes test for s. 1, the government 
must first show that the law has a pressing and substantial objective, and must 
further show that there is a rational connection between the means chosen and 
the objective, that the means minimally impair infringed rights and freedoms, and 
that the infringing effect of the means chosen is proportional to the beneficial 
effect of the law.148 Where Parliament is faced with inconclusive social science 
evidence, it must have a reasonable basis for the law and should be accorded a 
margin of deference in the means designed to address a particular issue.149 In the 
child pornography context, however, the justification standard is lowered even 
further. Butler defined a new “reasonable apprehension of harm” standard for 
justifying the Criminal Code obscenity provision under s. 1.150 This standard was 
then adopted by both the majority and the minority in Sharpe.151  
The main purpose of the law was defined as “the prevention of harm to 
children” by criminalizing possession of material that “poses a reasoned risk of 
harm to children”, while “attitudinal harm to society at large” was judicially 
noticed as a “good incidental” although not argued by the Crown.152 The Crown 
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proposed and McLachlin CJC considered five ways that possession of child 
pornography heightened the risk of child sexual abuse: “(1) child pornography 
promotes cognitive distortions; (2) it fuels fantasies that incite offenders; (3) 
prohibiting its possession assists law enforcement efforts to reduce the 
production, distribution and use that result in direct harm to children; (4) it is 
used for grooming and seducing; and (5) some child pornography is produced 
using real children”.153 For the purposes of my analysis, it is the cognitive 
distortions, fantasies, and incitement rationales that are of interest.154 
Cognitive distortions refers to the idea that “child pornography may change 
possessors’ attitudes in ways that makes them more likely to sexually abuse 
children. […] People who could not otherwise abuse children may consequently 
do so”.155 While the trial judge rejected this idea because of insufficient scientific 
evidence demonstrating a link between cognitive distortions and more offences, 
McLachlin CJC used the reasoned apprehension of harm standard and found that 
“[w]hile the scientific evidence is not strong, I am satisfied that the evidence in 
this case supports the existence of a connection”.156 
Incitement refers to the idea that possession “fuels fantasies, making 
paedophiles more likely to offend”.157 Again, the trial judge rejected this rationale 
on the basis that there was not a net effect of increased harm to children: while 
some studies showed a link between “highly erotic child pornography and 
offences”, other studies found that “both erotic and milder pornography might 
provide substitute satisfaction and reduce offences”.158 Again, McLachlin CJC 
rejected a scientific proof requirement, and used the reasoned apprehension of 
harm standard to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show a rational 
connection.159  
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In sum, both L’Heureux-Dubé J for the minority and McLachlin CJ for the 
majority took a liberal approach to the minimal impairment requirement, based 
on the “reasonable apprehension of harm” standard. L’Heureux-Dubé J 
specifically addressed images that do not use real children, concluding that 
“Parliament was justified in concluding that such works of the imagination would 
harm children”, in particular because there was no requirement to “choose the 
least ambitious means to protect vulnerable groups” and the speech in question 
was of “low value”.160 Although L’Heureux-Dube J was in the minority in Sharpe, 
McLachlin CJC espoused a similar approach.161 In summarizing the harms 
allegedly caused by child pornography, McLachlin CJC’s stated that “the social 
science evidence adduced in this case, buttressed by experience and common 
sense” satisfied the rational connection requirement because “[p]ossession of 
child pornography increases the risk of child abuse” and these risks could not be 
adequately targeted by prohibitions falling short of criminalizing possession.162  
By contrast, both the lower courts and certain Parliamentarians raised 
concerns about whether the scientific evidence was sufficiently conclusive to 
uphold the law. For instance, Sen. Stanbury spoke out against Bill C-128 in the 
Senate Debates. He felt that the bill would not pass constitutional muster because 
the objective was unclear, no causal relationship between means and objective 
was evident, and the bill was vague, broad, and failed to differentiate between 
explicit sex acts involving a seven-year-old and those involving a 17-year-old.163 
While Sen. Stanbury’s concerns focused on perceived risk of a chilling effect on 
expression, his comments on the potential result are pertinent:  
[T]he government, faced with an opportunity to deal seriously with 
some of the most hurtful human behavioural aberrations, acted hastily 
and carelessly, without due consideration or consultation. The result is 
bad legislation which will cost heavily in dollars and pain while the 
social diseases they intend to attack continue unabated.164 
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These same concerns have subsequently been raised by academics.165 Without 
proposing to change the s. 1 framework, there is a problem with the “reasoned 
apprehension of harm” standard in that it silently imports social values into the 
analysis. 
 A “reasoned apprehension of harm” that can be found based on 
inconclusive social scientific evidence by using “common sense” is unduly 
influenced by social context. Where that social context is one of vilification, as in 
the case of paedophilia and child pornography, the standard cannot be 
meaningfully applied.166 The reasons requirement becomes a sham and merely 
panders to community (i.e. majority) standards and assumptions. The affected 
citizens were neither consulted nor represented in the legislative drafting and 
vetting process, nor was government held to a meaningful standard of 
justification by the courts, such that the requirements of deliberative democracy 
were violated and the law can be seen as illegitimate. In particular, the 
combination of a low standard of proof for any harm Parliament seeks to protect 
and the social contingency of which groups or practices are seen as requiring 
protection can create a hurdle for marginalized and vilified groups seeking to 
make Charter-based arguments. 
L’Heureux-Dube J went further than the Sharpe majority by framing the issue 
in s. 163.1 as a competition between children’s s. 7 security of the person and 
privacy rights and s. 15 equality rights versus paedophiles s. 2(b) freedom of 
expression rights.167 While the majority dismissed Mr. Sharpe’s claim that his s. 7 
rights were engaged, L’Heureux-Dubé J ignored Mr. Sharpe’s s. 7 rights while 
considering those of children.168 She emphasized that where government 
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legislation promotes equality or moves against inequality, government objectives 
get elevated deference at the s. 1 justification stage.169 L’Heureux-Dubé J 
recognized that s. 163.1 was enacted “having regard to moral values”, but argued 
that not only does Parliament have the “right to make moral judgments in 
criminalizing certain forms of conduct”, but also the courts “should be 
particularly sensitive to the legitimate role of government in legislating with 
respect to our social values”.170 While legislation arrived at through diligent 
democratic process may legitimately express shared values, in effect as an output 
of the deliberative process, competing views and harms associated with the 
ultimate enactment should be conscientiously considered and were not in this 
case.   
In L’Heureux-Dubé J’s analysis, the only vulnerable and powerless group at 
play was children, yet given the social sanction paedophiles face if they reveal 
their sexual desires and thus their effective exclusion as paedophiles from 
democratic discourses, it is arguable that paedophiles are also a vulnerable and 
powerless group. While this argument provokes the retort that many paedophiles 
are adult men and thus inherently privileged, such a response ignores that identity 
is multifaceted and one may hold both privileged and disadvantaged identity 
markers. 
 On the attenuated s. 1 standard and given the current social and legal 
rights recognition and state of research at that time, the Sharpe analysis holds up. 
It is important to note, however, that the low standard of proof required under s. 
1 applies specifically where the evidence is inconclusive. This suggests that should 
more conclusive evidence come to light, the s. 1 analysis could shift. Additionally, 
Parliamentary choices in cases involving competing rights attract enhanced 
deference. I have already suggested that social scientific research evidence offers 
a widely acceptable form of reasons that could be deployed in the deliberative 
democratic process, and which could thereby contribute to the recognition of 
groups, such as paedophiles, as requiring protection under the Charter. 
                                                                                                                                         
169 Ibid at paras 187-88, 190. 
170 Ibid at para 191. 
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The tide of social science research is shifting towards a conclusion that the 
rationales provided in Sharpe for criminalizing fantasy materials are, at the least, 
riddled with holes. Some research even suggests the reverse is true: child 
pornography users and contact offenders are largely separate groups, and child 
pornography can actually reduce the incidence of risk of assaults against actual 
children. Where a law curtails individual liberty and imposes sanctions for 
gratifying one’s sexual identity, it is only legitimate when it is reasonably based – 
for instance to protect others in society. The reasons requirement is crucial 
because otherwise law will drift toward the benefit of the social majority and the 
status quo, to the detriment of marginalized groups and social evolution.  
Broad definitions of child pornography and criminalization of possession in 
various jurisdictions has exposed a new and under-researched category of people 
with paedophilic orientations: those who “demonstrate a sexual interest in 
children but seemingly have never and possibly will never be involved in contact 
sexual offences against children”.171 Kerry Sheldon and Dennis Howitt question 
the “frequent assumption that the use of Internet child pornography may be a 
stepping stone towards eventually sexually offending against children” and 
emphasize that the existence of non-offending paedophiles has been “largely 
ignored” in research and theory.172 They conclude that “[i]t is difficult … to 
sustain a simple model which suggests that sexual fantasies involving children in 
some way lead directly to sexual offending against children”.173 Rather, despite 
psychological similarities between Internet offenders and contact offenders, there 
is a “group with a paedophile orientation who desist (at least temporarily) from 
                                                                                                                                         
171 Kerry Sheldon and Dennis Howitt, “Sexual fantasy in paedophile offenders: Can any model explain 
satisfactorily new findings from a study of Internet and contact sexual offenders?” (2008) 13 Legal and 
Criminal Psychology 137 at 140.  
172 Ibid at 140-41. 
173 Ibid at 151. On the contrary, Sheldon and Howitt note that “if theory is correct and fantasy drives 
behaviour, Internet offenders should report the lowest level of paedophilic fantasy as they have no 
reported acts against children, yet the reverse was true.” One proposed explanation was that “Internet 
offenders may have less need to contact offend since they can generate fantasy more easily”. Ibid at 153. 
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offending directly against children” that needs to be better understood to facilitate 
clinical intervention.174 This is, however, more easily said than done. 
 Paedophilia and the use of child pornography pose a particular dilemma 
to researchers because of both the secrecy that surrounds these phenomena and 
the instability of definitions across cultures and through time.175 The potential for 
onerous criminal sanctions as well as the social isolation that can accompany 
exposure as a paedophile make such secrecy virtually inevitable and thus challenge 
researchers’ ability to identity research subjects.176 These problems are heightened 
by mandatory disclosure regimes that apply to therapists.177 As a result, samples 
in research studies are often small and limited to known offenders, which may 
distort results.178 Adding to the dilemma, techniques to manage the secrecy issue 
– such as anonymous participation through the Internet – discredit research 
findings because they are unverifiable and insufficiently controlled.179  
 The International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children produced 
a report on paedophilia that highlighted the research challenges posed by 
therapist disclosure obligations and social stigma, and concluded that: 
                                                                                                                                         
174 Ibid at 156.  
175 In the medical context, McManus et al’s review of the medical diagnostic criteria for paraphilias identified 
shifting definitional standards and secrecy as major barriers to research. McManus et al, supra note 39. C.f. 
John Carr and Zoe Hilton, “Combating child abuse images on the Internet: International Perspectives” in 
Julia Davidson and Petter Gottschalk, eds, Internet Child Abuse: Current Research and Policy (New York: 
Routledge, 2011) at 52-53. Social science researchers note similar problems. See e.g. Jenny ABM 
Houtepen, Jelle J Sijtsema, and Stefan Bogaerts, “From child pornography offending to child sexual abuse: 
A review of child pornography offender characteristics and risks for cross-over” (2014) 19 Aggression and 
Violent Behavior 466 at 467. Similar problems are noted in virtually every study I examined for this paper. 
176 Janina Neutze, Dorit Grundmann, Georld Scherner, and Klaus Michael Beier, “Undetected and detected 
child sexual abuse and child pornography offenders” (2012) 35 International J Law and Psychiatry 168 at 168. 
See also David L Riegel, “Pedophilia, Pejoration, and Prejudice: Inquiry by Insinuation, Argument by 
Accusation” (2005) 9:1 Sexuality and Culture 88-97 [“Pedophilia”]; Shadows Project, supra note 79; Virtuous 
Pedophiles, supra note 79.  
177 See above note 112.  
178 See e.g. Michael C Seto, Chantal A Hermann, Cecilia Kjellgren, Gisela Priebe, Carl Goran Svedin, and 
Niklas Langstrom, “Viewing Child Pornography: Prevalence and correlates in a Representative 
Community Sample of Young Swedish Men” (2015) 44 Arch Sex Behav 67 at 67-68; Seto, Cantor, and 
Blanchard, supra note 26 at 614-5; Neutze, Grundmann, Scherner and Beier, supra note 177 at 168-69; 
Hannah L Merdian, Cate Curtis, Jo Thakker, Nick Wilson, and Douglas P Boer, “The endorsement of 
cognitive distortions: comparing child pornography offenders and contact sex offenders” (2014) 20:10 
Psychology, Crime & Law 971 at 989-91. 
179 David Riegel’s Internet-based study, below at note 192, was not successful in the peer-review process. It 
relied on self-reporting and self-selecting after advertisement posted on numerous Internet sites. While 
Riegel’s data is intriguing, it cannot attract scientific credibility. 
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[A]lthough pedophiles have the potential to sexually offend against 
minors, they do not necessarily wish to engage in CSA [child sexual 
abuse]. Every effort should be made to better understand the 
foundations of pedophilic attraction and to identify and establish 
preventative treatment methods internationally. To achieve this, both 
legislation and social acceptance, which are highly related to one 
another, must be modified. […] [T]he negative impacts of pedophilia 
possibly can be mitigated with support and treatment to help them 
cope with their sexual preferences and/or refrain from acting upon 
their sexual desires toward children. 180 
Thus, while Houtepen, Sijtsema and Bogaerts recognized that cross-over does 
occur, they also recognize that for some people viewing child pornography 
actually prevents cross-over. Moreover, while the precise parameters of the link 
between child pornography use and contact offences are not yet the subject of 
scientific consensus, research on cognitive distortions suggests that child 
pornography users are different than contact offenders.  
 Research on cognitive distortions has shown that the relationship 
between cognitive distortions and child sexual offences is more complex than was 
suggested in Sharpe. Howitt and Sheldon compared cognitive distortions in 
Internet pornography offenders with those of contact offenders against 
children.181 They found a “significant difference” between Internet and contact 
offenders: Internet pornography offenders were more likely to endorse the ideas 
relating to children are sexual objects, such as the idea that children are sexual 
beings and appropriate objects of sexual attention.182 Howitt and Sheldon 
conclude that this is “difficult to reconcile with a simple view that cognitive 
distortions lead directly to offending against children and that the greater levels 
of cognitive distortion should be associated with the worst crimes against 
children”.183  
 Building directly on Howitt and Sheldon’s work, Merdian et al further 
studied the difference between contact and child pornography offenders with a 
                                                                                                                                         
180 Olshan, supra note 79 at 22. 
181 Dennis Howitt and Kerry Sheldon, “The role of cognitive distortions in paedophilic offending: Internet 
and contact offenders compared” (2007) 13:5 Psychology, Crime & Law 469 at 473. 
182 Ibid at 475-76. 
183 Ibid at 482. While recognizing the challenge of drawing strong conclusions due to limited and conflicting 
research, Howitt and Sheldon concluded that the very idea of cognitive distortions was likely flawed. Ibid at 
482-84. 
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view to understanding the risk of re-offence by child pornography offenders 
(CPOs) and their risk for cross-over to contact child sexual abuse (child sex 
offenders or CSOs).184 They bluntly stated that “CPOs should not be treated like 
CSOs without supportive research evidence”.185 Their research developed the 
scale of cognitions used by Howitt and Sheldon to include more diverse and 
offence-specific cognitions. Their findings accorded with other research indicting 
“little evidence of antisociality and high psychological barriers [to contact 
offending] amongst this non-contact offender group”.186 Merdian et al conclude 
that “(1) CPOs endorse fewer cognitive distortions than CSOs on conventional 
measures of attitudes towards children and sex and (2) CPOs endorse cognitive 
distortions of particular relevance to their offending, which are not included in 
standardised measures”.187 In other words, while child pornography offenders 
saw looking at child pornography as acceptable, they did not usually see sex with 
children as acceptable. 
Sara M. Smyth’s review of empirical research since Sharpe similarly found 
that the “moral corruption” rationale undergirding the suppression of imaginary 
works does not hold up. In Smyth’s analysis, recent research indicates that: (i) 
Internet child pornography consumption is unlikely to result in contact offences 
against children; (ii) Internet child pornography consumers’ primary interest in 
children is fantasy-based; (iii) Internet child pornography consumers have 
more/higher levels of cognitive distortions about child sexuality than contact 
offenders; and (iv) neither deviant fantasy (such as fantasy about child sexual 
abuse) nor viewing child pornography is causally linked to committing contact 
offences.188 In sum, reputable scientific evidence undermines the linkage between 
consumers of child pornography and contact-offenders and suggests instead that 
                                                                                                                                         
184 Merdian et al, supra note 178 at 972.   
185 Ibid at 973. 
186 Ibid at 987. 
187 Ibid at 988. They found that child pornography offenders’ were less likely overall to endorse cognitive 
distortions, and that their “cognitions are offence-specific … CPOs’ agreement was higher towards items 
that were targeted towards their unique situation” (items along the lines of looking is not as bad as 
touching, or sexual thoughts about a child are not that bad because they do not really hurt the child). 
Moreover, while child pornography offenders would endorse statements portraying children as sexual 
objects, they largely would not endorse statements justifying sexual contact with children. Ibid at 988. 
188 Smyth, supra note 9 at 96-100. 
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child pornography may act as an outlet for paedophilic desires and reduce the risk 
of child sexual abuse in some cases.  
A 2002 study of Internet child pornography offenders reported by David L. 
Riegel found that viewing male child pornography on the Internet provides a 
“useful as a substitute for actual sexual contact with boys”.189 Sara M. Smyth cited 
Riegel’s study as strong evidence in support of this contention, and Carissa 
Hessick adverts to the fact that Riegel’s study has been noted in other scientific 
literature.190 However, Riegel’s study must be treated with some caution because 
it was published as a letter to the editor because the study did not meet the 
standards of the peer review process. In Reigel’s study, more than 80% of 
respondents affirmed that such viewing “redirected” and provided an “outlet that 
affected no other person”.191 Consistent with that finding, more than 80% 
rejected the idea that “the use of erotica increased [their] tendency to seek out 
boys for the sole purpose of sexual activity” and more than 50% of these 
respondent felt either somewhat or significantly relieved after viewing male child 
pornography.192 Riegel noted that the study specifically addressed the idea of 
“enticing” (what the Sharpe court called “grooming”) and more than 75% 
reported never having shared male child pornography with a male child. While 
Riegel’s study is weak evidence, Carissa Hessick notes that there are other studies, 
also controversial due to sampling limitations, “which suggest that, if individuals 
have access to pornography, then it may reduce contact offences”.193 In short, 
not only is there little if any scientific evidence supporting the causal link between 
                                                                                                                                         
189 David L Riegel, “Letter to the Editor: Effects on Boy-Attracted Pedosexual Males of Viewing Boy Erotica” 
(2004) 33:4 Arch Sex Behav 321 at 322 [“Letter to the Editor”]. It is important to note that Riegel’s 
comment was published as a Letter to the Editor because the lengthier original manuscript did not survive 
the peer-review process. However, an editor’s note specifically noted that Riegel was invited to submit as a 
Letter to the Editor because the material would be of interest to members of the academic community. 
Riegel is a proponent of paedophile-rights and an independent writer and researcher who has published a 
book as well as several peer-reviewed articles and contributed to a chapter in a human sexuality textbook. I 
hasten to add that I am not in agreement, nor is this paper proposing the propriety of any sexual relations 
between adults and children, as Riegel has elsewhere suggested can be acceptable: Riegel, “Pedophilia”, 
supra note 176. 
190 Smyth, supra note 9 at 100-101; Hessick, supra note 90 at 876-78.  
191 Riegel, “Letter to the Editor”, supra note 192 at 322. 
192 Ibid at 322. 
193 Hessick, supra note 90 at 876-78. Hessick further notes that in the adult pornography context, there is 
evidence disproving the hypothesis that exposure to violence pornography causes violence against women 
and suggesting instead an inverse relationship between viewing explicit sexual materials and violence, 
leading her to the conclusion that “the modern view of non-child pornography is more nuanced and 
tolerant”. Ibid at 878. 
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child pornography consumption and contact sexual offences, there is also some 
evidence contradicting that link and instead suggesting that child pornography can 
actually reduce the risk of contact sexual offences. 
 It is arguable that even on the “reasoned apprehension of harm” 
standard, the existence of countervailing evidence – as opposed to a mere lack of 
positive evidence – should affect the s. 1 analysis. Where materials involve actual 
children – whether they are merely possessed or produced, distributed, etc. – the 
justification remains unassailable. But where the materials do not involve children, 
as is the case for fantasy materials, the social science evidence showing that the 
“child pornography begets child sexual abuse” rationale is ill-conceived and that 
using child pornography can actually alleviate paedophilic desire and thus 
potentially reduce child sexual abuse should mean that the portion of s. 163.1 
including fantasy materials would not satisfy the s. 1 analysis.  
In the Senate debate on Bill C-279 to which I referred earlier, Sen. Plett’s 
concern that paedophiles would abuse any right to use bathrooms corresponding 
to one’s gender identity was rooted in anecdotal evidence.194 Another Senator, 
Sen. Mitchell, responded to Sen. Plett, saying: 
I do know that we don't hold everyone in a category responsible for a 
crime that someone in that category might commit. White males 
commit crimes, but we don't hold all of us responsible and make all of 
us act in certain ways because another White male might commit a 
crime; nor should we hold transgendered people responsible.195  
Sen. Mitchell’s point is relevant to the problem with the legislative standard in s. 
163.1, as interpreted by the SCC. The fact some paedophiles commit contact 
offences against children does not necessarily mean that all paedophiles do, nor 
does it necessarily mean that all paedophiles should be cut off from child 
pornography that does not involve actual children. In its current state, research 
on paedophilia and child pornography likely cannot support a complete 
reconceptualization of the social and legal treatment of paedophiles, but should 
                                                                                                                                         
194 Sen. Plett’s concern arose from an anecdote wherein a man exposed himself to a six-year-old child and her 
mother in a college change room in Chicago. 
195 Debates of the Senate, supra note 67 at 1550 (Hon Grant Mitchell). 
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be a sufficient basis on which to demand a new iteration of democratic 
deliberation on s. 163.1. 
Paedophiles as a group are marked in society as threatening and mentally ill, 
and can be criminalized for gratifying their sexual desires. Williams’ concerns 
about the meaningful inclusion of marginalized groups in the deliberative 
democratic framework are therefore applicable. Williams hypothesized that only 
socio-political organization and threat to majority well-being would lead to 
recognition of these groups’ voice in the democratic discourse. For paedophiles, 
this seems unlikely to materialize, despite the existence of online peer support 
networks that provide a community-building function.196 The International 
Centre for Missing and Exploited Children’s 2014 report argued that “both 
legislation and social acceptance, which are highly related to one another, must 
be modified” to allow research on paedophilia and lead “better understand the 
foundations of pedophilic attraction” and thus undercut the stigmatization of 
paedophiles.197  
 In Canada, the Charter is a beacon of our social values and aims to ensure 
that individuals and groups in society are treated with dignity and respect by 
government action. In effect, the Charter attempts to create the fundamental 
condition of equality mandated by the deliberative democratic approach. As such, 
it is the appropriate vehicle for achieving greater socio-political acceptance of 
paedophiles, removing the stigma that attends paedophilia, and enabling a more 
fulsome discussion of the benefits and burdens of s. 163.1. Without removing the 
stigma, better research and thus better understanding will remain elusive. There 
are two bases upon which paedophilia could receive Charter protection: s.7 and s. 
15. In this final section, I propose a broad and necessarily speculative outline of 
these potential arguments. 
                                                                                                                                         
196 See above note 79.  
197 Olshan, supra note 79 at 22.  
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 As mentioned above, the Sharpe court rolled Mr. Sharpe’s s. 7 arguments 
into the s. 2(b) analysis, thus depriving both him and the public of their analysis 
on these issues. The s. 7 protections for liberty and security of the person ought 
to be engaged by s. 163.1. Since the offences in s. 163.1 carry mandatory 
minimum sentences, the liberty interest is engaged in this respect. Section 7 is, 
however, also engaged in a more fundamental fashion because of the interference 
with individual sexual desire. Where fundamental personal choices affecting 
psychological integrity are engaged, liberty and security of the person become 
intertwined: 
Liberty protects “the right to make fundamental personal choices free 
from state interference” […]  Security of the person encompasses “a 
notion of personal autonomy involving . . . control over one’s bodily 
integrity free from state interference” […] and it is engaged by state 
interference with an individual’s physical or psychological integrity, 
including any state action that causes physical or serious psychological 
suffering […] 198 
 The main challenge posed under the s. 7 framework is the SCC decision 
in R v Malmo-Levine, wherein the court refused to attach constitutional protection 
under s. 7 to lifestyle choices and rejected the harm principle – that Parliament 
cannot impose criminal liability in the absence of evidence of harm to others – as 
a principle of fundamental justice.199 The appellants in that case raised both liberty 
and security of the person arguments. The security of the person arguments were 
rejected by Gonthier and Binnie JJ for the majority in cursory terms: “[T]he 
Constitution cannot be stretched to afford protection to whatever activity an 
individual chooses to define as central to his or her lifestyle. […] Prohibition 
would not therefore lead to a level of stress that is constitutionally cognizable.  A 
very different issue would arise if the marihuana was required for medical 
purposes, but neither appellant uses marihuana for such a purpose.”200 
                                                                                                                                         
198 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at para 64 (citations omitted) [Carter v Canada]. 
199 R v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine, 2003 SCC 74 [Malmo-Levine] at paras 103, 111.  
200 Ibid at paras 86-88. 
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The use of child pornography for sexual gratification might well be relegated 
to the status of a lifestyle choice, and without further research to show a sufficient 
psychological stress resulting from denying access to this material, a s. 7 argument 
could be rejected on this basis.201 On the other hand, the SCC has more recently 
rejected a “choice” argument in Canada (Attorney-General) v Bedford, where the court 
acknowledged that some choices (like sex-trade work) are not real choices.202 
While the argument is weaker when speaking about using child pornography, the 
idea of completely suppressing one’s sexual impulses could be classified as a non-
choice. Additionally, it is sufficient for s. 7 that the state conduct contribute to 
the risk of harm.203 In light of testimonials from paedophiles on peer support 
forums like Virtuous Paedophiles, it is possible that the enhanced isolation and 
consequent psychological stress resulting from the child pornography 
prohibition’s perpetuation of social prejudice against paedophiles could meet this 
standard. 
 While the risk of imprisonment for a simple possession offence 
unquestionably implicates the liberty interest,204 a s. 7 challenge could falter on 
the principles of fundamental justice. The Malmo-Levine court rejected the harm 
principle.205 In Bedford and Carter v Canada (Attorney General) the SCC affirmed the 
recognition of three principles of fundamental justice: arbitrariness, overbreadth, 
and gross disproportionality.206 Section 7 is individually focused: it is enough that 
a single person’s s. 7 interests are denied. 207 Provided an accused could show 
their use of child pornography within the s. 163.1 definition did not cause 
attitudinal harm or harm to children, the law would be overbroad in that its means 
would not be related to its objective. The challenge of proving such an absence 
of harm would, however, be formidable in light of the amorphous nature of 
                                                                                                                                         
201 Professor Sheila Wildeman (Dalhousie University) also suggested that relegating sexual gratification 
through pornography to a lifestyle choice might conflict with the recognition that sexual expression by 
sexual minorities attracts protection under s. 2(b) of the Charter, which protection is influenced by s. 15 
equality arguments. See e.g., Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2000 SCC 69 
[Little Sisters]. 
202 Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at paras 79-92 [Bedford]. 
203 Ibid at paras 59-71. 
204 Malmo-Levine, supra note 202 at para 89. 
205 Ibid at paras 111-29.   
206 Bedford, supra note 205 at paras 108-123; Carter v Canada, supra note 201 at paras 71-73, 83, 85, 89.  
207 Bedford, supra note 205 at para 123. 
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attitudinal harm. Rather than imposing this onus on the accused, recognizing 
paedophiles as a group entitled to protection under s. 15 would shift the onus 
onto the government to demonstrate the necessity of discriminating against 
paedophiles. 
 The s. 15 analysis has been recently synthesized by the SCC in Quebec v 
A, wherein Abella J spoke for the majority on the s. 15 issue. 208 Abella J affirmed 
the applicability of the Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia test as reformulated 
by R v Kapp and Withler v Canada (Attorney General) in the following terms: 
[323] In sum, the claimant’s burden under the Andrews test is to show 
that the government has made a distinction based on an enumerated 
or analogous ground and that the distinction’s impact on the individual 
or group perpetuates disadvantage.  If this has been demonstrated, the 
burden shifts to the government to justify the reasonableness of the 
distinction under s. 1. […] 
[324]  Kapp, and later Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 
(CanLII), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396, restated these principles as follows: (1) 
Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous 
ground?  (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating 
prejudice or stereotyping? (Kapp, at para. 17; Withler, at para. 
30).  […]209 
In her reasons, Abella J emphasized three points. First, historical disadvantage or 
prejudice remains a relevant indicator of groups requiring protection, even in the 
absence of ongoing overt discriminatory societal attitudes.210 Second, prejudice 
or stereotyping are not discrete requirements under the test for discrimination 
but rather serve as “indicia” of whether a particular distinction has the effect of 
creating or perpetuating disadvantage.211 Third, s. 15 is concerned with preventing 
discriminatory effects, and does not require a discriminatory intention. On this 
third point, Abella J adopted McIntyre J’s discussion of disadvantage in Andrews: 
                                                                                                                                         
208 Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5 [Quebec v A]. 
209 Ibid at paras 323-324. 
210 Ibid at para 318.   
211 Ibid at paras 322-30.  
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[...] [D]iscrimination may be described as a distinction, whether 
intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal 
characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing 
burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon 
others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages 
available to other members of society.212 
Abella J also highlighted the symbiotic relationship between discriminatory laws 
and the perpetuation of prejudice and stereotyping, reasoning that: 
[…] Attitudes of prejudice and stereotyping can undoubtedly lead to 
discriminatory conduct, and discriminatory conduct in turn can 
reinforce these negative attitudes, since “the very exclusion of the 
disadvantaged group . . .  fosters the belief, both within and outside the 
group, that the exclusion is the result of ‘natural’ forces, for example, 
that women ‘just can’t do the job’” (Action Travail, at p. 1139).213  
Abella J’s latter point is particularly relevant in the context of child pornography 
and paedophilia in two respects. First, s. 163.1 casts the net of child pornography 
broadly based on the idea that child pornography leads to child sexual offences, 
yet I have shown that research not only questions this premise but suggests that 
prohibiting paedophiles from accessing some form of sexual outlet may actually 
increase the incidence of contact offences, thereby reinforcing the view that there 
is a natural and unavoidable connection between paedophilia and contact sexual 
offences. Second, differentiating child pornography from other pornography 
draws a distinction between normal sexuality and normal pornography (legal, 
provided it does not cross the obscenity line) and deviant, child-focused sexuality 
and pornography (illegal). By criminalizing the expression of paedophilic desire, 
social rejection of those who possess this desire receives the legislative and judicial 
stamp of legitimacy. Moreover, convicted child pornography offenders are 
additionally subject to the social rejection that attends criminal conviction. 
Together, these factors naturalize the exclusion of paedophiles.  
 Whether paedophilia is a mental disorder or a sexual orientation need 
not be determined to consider whether s. 15 ought to be applicable to the s. 163.1 
                                                                                                                                         
212 Ibid at para 322 [emphasis in original].  
213 Ibid at para 326.  
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child pornography provision.214 Mental disability is an enumerated ground and 
sexual orientation is an analogous ground.215 While the contextual factors for 
assessing the “perpetuation of arbitrary disadvantage” might change depending 
on the categorization of the applicable ground of prohibited discrimination, there 
would be significant similarities. Abella J identified a non-exhaustive list of these 
factors, including “pre-existing disadvantage, correspondence with actual 
characteristics, impact on other groups and the nature of the interest affected”.216 
I now turn to consider these factors. 
The obvious stumbling blocks would be the nature of the interest affected 
and the impact on other groups. On the former, sexual gratification is seen as a 
base interest deserving of minimal constitutional protection, though sexual 
minorities are also seen as protected by equality and freedom of expression values. 
217 On the latter, child pornography has undeniable and serious negative effects 
on children. The consideration of countervailing interests, however, more 
properly belongs at the s. 1 justification stage, in particular because of the 
possibility of drawing the legal prohibition more narrowly so as to exclude 
materials that do not include real children (i.e. permit fantasy child pornography 
including so-called “dress down” pornography). On the other hand, as I have 
endeavored to show, the other factors weigh in favour of recognizing a 
perpetuation of disadvantage. Canada’s child pornography law makes 
assumptions that are at least potentially at odds with actual characteristics. 
Furthermore, paedophiles suffer from pre-existing and ongoing disadvantage in 
that they are the subject of long-standing social revulsion and vilification. In sum, 
while this matter will ultimately fall to the courts to determine, there is an arguable 
case for a s. 15 argument in respect of the effect of s. 163.1 on paedophiles. 
                                                                                                                                         
214 Both categorizations are arguable given their socially contingent nature, but a full consideration of this 
debate is beyond the scope of this paper. The concept of immutability arguably weighs into both mental 
disorder and sexual orientation. Mental disorder might perhaps be distinguished on the basis of 
maladaptivity, but this too depends on majority social values. If the historical treatment of homosexuality 
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 Recognizing that s. 163.1 violates s. 15 would be a preferable solution to 
rectifying both the legal and social attitudes towards paedophiles. There is a 
symbolic and political value attached to a finding of discrimination under s. 15, 
even where it is found justified under s. 1. A finding of discrimination recognizes 
the affected group as deserving of societal protection and acknowledges the 
detrimental effects of a law on that group. On the legal side, s. 15 is preferable 
for two reasons.  
First, justifying s. 15 infringements under s. 1 is easier than justifying s. 7 
infringements. This is in large part because the s. 7 and s. 1 tests are inverse to 
one another:  the principles of fundamental justice (arbitrariness, overbreadth, 
and gross disproportionality) mirror the proportionality components of the Oakes 
test (rational connection, minimal impairment, and proportionality). While the 
parallel nature of s. 7 and s. 1 suggest that it should be nearly impossible to justify 
a s. 7 violation, the SCC has recently adverted to the conditions in which such a 
justification would be possible.218  
The SCC approach to the s. 1 analysis in Sharpe suggests that the provision 
would be upheld as a justified infringement. While the liberty interest might hold 
greater weight than freedom of expression, without more conclusive social 
science evidence or a changed social context, it is possible that the court would 
nevertheless uphold the provision. 
Second, s. 15 is especially susceptible to the balancing of rights inherent in 
the Charter because of the multiple groups receiving protection.219 Indeed in 
Sharpe itself L’Heureux-Dube J cast the debate between protecting children and 
freedom of expression more broadly than the majority and held that children’s s. 
15 rights were implicated in the child pornography debate. These considerations 
are significant because of the clear risk of harm posed by child pornography using 
real children – Parliament must have the authority to create and the court must 
have the authority uphold laws that prohibit the production and dissemination of 
child pornography involving real children. Elaine Craig, in advocating for a 
                                                                                                                                         
218 Carter v Canada, supra note 201 at para 95. 
219 Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31 at paras 26-37.  
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constructivist approach to legal regulation of sexuality that orients to the 
protection of sexual integrity, has similarly recognized the unavoidable tension. 
Craig acknowledges that non-arbitrary legal regulation of sexuality necessarily 
requires criteria for distinguishing “good” from “bad” sex, which is in tension 
with the idea of sexuality as socially constructed.220  
 On the social side, the benefit of recognizing a s. 15 infringement is that 
the Charter and in particular s. 15 serve as a beacon of fundamental values in 
Canadian society. A proper assessment of s. 163.1’s legitimacy is hampered by the 
context of social vilification that surrounds paedophilia. Pertinent research is 
challenging if not impossible, and the legal test for justification imports 
community moral standards. Rectifying the social exclusion of paedophiles is not 
only beneficial in its own right but would reduce the research barriers.221 
Moreover, Houtepen, Sijtsema, and Bogaerts suggest that isolated child 
pornography offenders “may be at greater risk for committing child sexual abuse 
than those who are also able to discuss their feelings with other non-pedophilic 
individuals in the offline environment” and that “fantasy-only offenders are at 
risk due to feelings of loneliness and low self-esteem”.222 Thus not only may the 
child pornography law be broader than is necessary to achieve its objective, it may 
actually be detrimental to that objective. With appropriate research, Parliament 
could design a law that is properly tailored to achieve its objectives while 
minimally affecting paedophiles’ ability to maximally exercise their sexual 
personhood. Should Parliament prove unwilling to do so – a real possibility given 
the political sensitivity of the issue223 – the courts would not be able to defer to 
Parliament in the face of more conclusive evidence than was available when 
Sharpe was decided.  
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 Returning to the idea of deliberative democracy, equality is one of the 
two fundamental conditions for the deliberative democratic model, and legal 
legitimacy can only be acquired where those who are affected by the law have a 
chance to weigh in on an equal footing. Section 15 explicitly recognizes that social 
context places certain groups at a disadvantage and attempts to rectify that 
disadvantage by constitutionally mandating equality before and under the law. 
Although more loosely applied, it is also serves as a means of advancing social 
equality. Moreover, advancing equality would also help to facilitate the 
articulation of reasons that would be understandable to other members of society, 
in particular through research.  
Under our democratic constitutional framework, the courts are charged with 
ensuring that the legislature respects the fundamental tenets of the Charter that 
represent the basic social consensus on the balance between individual rights and 
freedoms and legitimate government restrictions on those rights and freedoms. 
Because of the evolving nature of Charter protections, the Charter is an attempt to 
both codify and protect deliberative democratic consensus. Despite its 
shortcomings, the Charter is a real-world instance of a deliberative democratic 
consensus, and protects the pre-conditions to maintaining legal legitimacy as 
viewed through the deliberative democratic lens. Courts are charged with 
protecting both that consensus, and so are in a sense the guardian angels of 
legitimacy. But where the legal test for assessing the legitimacy of government 
action becomes watered down and so polluted by social context as to preclude 
respectful attention to the reasons of all affected parties, the Court can no longer 
serve that function. Moreover, where legislative deliberation excludes affected 
parties, the requirements of equality and reasons are no longer met. In these 
conditions the Charter cannot protect the agreed upon balance between the input 
of legal subjects and the action of lawmakers.  
Section 163.1 aims to protect children, but was drafted without deliberation 
between all affected parties. Most significantly, those who have a sexual desire for 
children were not consulted before they were criminally prohibited from 
gratifying their sexual desire. I have endeavoured to show that what is socially and 
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morally acceptable sexual desire can and does change. Admittedly the necessity 
of distinguishing between unacceptable sexual acts between adults and children 
and potentially acceptable adult sexual desire for children poses an additional 
complexity for examining paedophilia as opposed to homosexuality. Complexity, 
however, is not an excuse for failing to uphold the sexual integrity and equality 
of all members of society. The Parliamentary drafting process was deficient when 
measured against the requirements of deliberative democracy. As a result of the 
conjunction between a social context that vilifies paedophiles and hinders 
effective social scientific research and the analytical framework used to assess 
constitutional legitimacy, the Supreme Court of Canada did not correct these 
deficiencies. Based on the current state of social scientific research on child 
pornography and paedophilia, which suggests that only a highly attenuated risk 
of harm to children is posed by paedophiles using child pornography, s. 163.1 
needs reconsideration. In particular, accepting “fantasy” pornography that does 
not use any real children might strike the appropriate balance between children’s 
rights and paedophiles’ rights. I have proposed that Charter protection for 
paedophiles under s. 7 and s. 15 offers a means of mitigating social, political, and 
legal vilification of paedophiles, but will likely be hindered by that same 
vilification. As such, a return to the fundamental tenets of deliberative democracy 
is necessary to facilitate the iterative development of Charter protections. Careful 
attention to deliberative democracy and Charter-protections for paedophiles are 
required to achieve the conditions necessary to conscientiously evaluate the 
appropriate balance between protecting children and protecting paedophiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
